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ABSTRACT 
The electricity industry in New Zealand has undergone continual evolution since the 
corporatisation of the New Zealand Electricity Division of the Ministry of Energy in 
1987. 
The object of this paper is to weigh the rationale for, and the results of the State sector 
economic reforms of the 1980s, and the effect of competition law in New Zealand, 
against the policy reasons behind, and the potential impact of, our most recent 
electricity reform: the Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998. 
The paper concludes that the structural changes imposed on the electricity industry by 
the forced ownership separation of electricity lines businesses and electricity supply 
businesses, are largely consistent with the pursuit of rationalisation, efficiency and 
competition, backed by the constraints of the Commerce Act 1986. 
However, while the Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998 does not impose traditional 
"heavy-handed" regulation on the industry, in the sense of consistent government 
intervention through price control, it does allow the government to interfere in an 
unprecedented and drastic manner in the private property rights of businesses and 
investors in the electricity industry. It is submitted that the Electricity Industry Refonn 
Act has effectively created a new form of "heavy-handed" regulation, which is likely to 
be the focus of much academic debate, and also the potential focus of considerable 
litigation, as power companies are forced to divest their assets and undergo severe value 
losses. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes , bibliography and annexures) 
comprises approximately 17,000 words. 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Modem industrial society functions with the expectation that electricity will be 
available when required. The New Zealand electricity industry has undergone a 
continuous transformation from 1987 to the present to ensure that this expectation is 
met, with the ultimate goal of lower costs for customers. 
The most recent reform of the electricity industry, the Electricity Industry Reform Act 
("the Act") , was passed on 3 July 1998. It was driven by the government's concern 
with the anti-competitive practices and uncompetitive prices arising from vertically 
integrated electricity monopolies. This Act has taken a nuclear bomb approach to the 
industry, setting in place the means for destruction of all of the structures in place at 23 
June 1998. In general terms, the Act requires energy companies to undertake an 
ownership split of their lines business and their energy business. Two options are 
given; either a mirror trust option or a full sale option with a transitional corporate split 
requirement. At the generation level of the industry, the Act breaks up the State 
generator ECNZ, to create four generating entities, each with an ability to supply energy 
at the retail level. 
Arguments have been raised by the Act's numerous detractors that it is "an example of 
heavy-handed State intervention of a kind not seen since the days of Muldoonism", 
1 
strong criticism indeed. The purpose of this paper is to describe and analyse the policy 
behind the regulation of the electricity industry, with particular emphasis on the Act, in 
order to determine if the latest reforms are commensurate with existing policy, or 
whether they signal a reversion to the days of intense governmental intervention in the 
economy. The potential impacts of the Act, as identified by the author, will be 
compared and contrasted with the goals of competition and economic policy, in order to 
achieve this purpose. 
1 Doug Matheson, President, Electricity Supply Authority of New Zealand "Bradford Bill Reeks of 
Muldoonism", (Mediacom Press Release Distribution, Wellington, 12 June 1998). "Muldoonism" refers 
to the interventionist policies in place under former Prime Minister Sir Robert Muldoon. The term is 
synonymous with direct government intervention to control wages and prices, to regulate markets, trade 
and investment. 
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Section II begins by rev1ewmg the functions of public utilities and describing the 
electricity industry prior to 1986. This will provide a necessary background to an 
understanding of the policy problems inherent in regulating utilities such as electricity. 
Many of the difficulties New Zealand still faces arise from the major expansion in the 
role of the State during the past hundred years. 
Section III goes on to examine the historical source of public utility monopolisation. 
This general overview of the economic liberalisation policies of government since 1984 
highlights the transition in the electricity industry from statutory monopoly to vertically 
integrated monopoly in energy companies; and in generation to a more transparent, but 
equally uncompetitive State-owned enterprise. The characteristics of New Zealand's 
approach to competition law and policy are described, because this law is used to 
underpin the regulation of the electricity industry. , Given that the emphasis of this 
paper is on consideration of the impact of the Act, there is only a brief examination of 
the Commerce Act 1986 and the cases decided under it, and of the Electricity 
(Information Disclosure) Regulations 1994. 
Section IV provides an analysis of the impact of the state sector and competition law 
reforms on the electricity industry. Certain unresolved monopoly problems directly 
triggered the introduction of the Act. 
A detailed outline of the Act is given in Section V. Little published commentary exists 
on the Act at present and for this reason, an examination of its core provisions and their 
possible legal implications, is essential. Certain criticisms have been levelled at the Act 
- not least for its complicated nature. 
Finally, Section VI assesses the Act in terms of its compatibility with the rationale for, 
and effect of, prior electricity reform in New Zealand. The industry-specific structure 
developed by the Act, which is backed by general antitrust legislation, is not found to be 
heavy-handed in terms of competition law. However, it will ultimately involve greater 
State involvement in the electricity industry, contrary to the general economic 
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philosophy of the State maintaining its distance from commercial enterprise. Such 
involvement is ironic, unless, as submitted, the reforms herald a spate of privatisation of 
government-owned generating capacity. The further conclusion is drawn that the Act 
has imposed a new and drastic form of government interference on the electricity 
industry. The forced divestment of power companies' assets is extraordinarily intrusive 
intervention in the private property rights of businesses, communities and investors. 
A The Components of the Electricity Industry 
It is convenient at this stage to examine the five stages of production, delivery and sale 
of electricity to consumers in New Zealand. 
1 Generation 
New Zealand's electricity generation 1s sourced in hydro-electric , wind-powered, 
geothermal, natural gas and coal fired thermal power stations. Hydro electricity 
accounted for about 79 per cent of electricity generation in 1996, 
2 despite the fact that 
New Zealand's hydro lakes have a total storage capacity of only about 12 per cent of the 
annual electricity demand (this equates to approximately 10 weeks storage).
3 
2 Wholesale Electricity Market 
The trading of electricity in the wholesale market is a system of trading electricity in 
which electricity contracts can be traded independently of ECNZ. The industry has 
moved rapidly from a situation where the price was set by a monopoly supplier to one 
where prices are based on bids and offers from market participants. 
2 Ministry for the Environment, Ian Smith ( chief ed) The State of New Zealand's Environment (Ministry 
for the Environment, 1997), 3.21. 
3 Dave Frow "New Zealand Electricity - Past, Present and Future" ", Conference of the Electric Power 
Supply Industry Keynote Address (Christchurch, 19-23 September 1994), 35. 
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3 Transmission 
Electricity is transmitted throughout New Zealand from power stations to regions of 
substantial electricity consumption by high capacity, high voltage (220,000 volts) 
interlinked transmission lines (the national grid) owned by Trans Power. 
4 Distribution 
Electricity is distributed locally by power company distribution networks that operate at 
lower voltages (110,000, 33,000 and 400 volts) and in smaller geographic areas than 
Trans Power's transmission line network. Distribution concerns the operation and 
management of the lines, cables, transformers, switches and other physical equipment 
which is needed to cause electricity to flow from Trans Power's substations to those 
places where consumers use electricity. 
5 Retailing 
Power companies and independent retailers sell electricity to consumers. They pay 
Trans Power for access to its transmission network to transmit electricity from power 
stations to its substations prior to distribution and sale. 
II PUBLIC UTILITIES IN NEW ZEALAND 
Public utilities are individuals and companies that provide the public ( or a section of it) 
with gas, water, telecommunications, or electricity. Public utilities have two 
distinguishing characteristics: 4 
1) they provide a distribution, transmission or transport service through a network 
of cables, pipes or other facilities that tend to enjoy such large-scale economies 
as to become natural monopolies. 5 
4 
Michael Taggart "Public Utilities and Public Law" in Philip A Joseph (ed) Essays on the Constitution 
~Brookers, Wellington, 1995), 214. 
See text at footnote 15 . 
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2) the service they provide is often an "essential" input to other industries, so the 
efficiency of utilities has a widespread impact on the efficiency of other firms. 
(Essential facilities are those that cannot practically be duplicated, and to which 
access is required by those who wish to compete in up or downstream markets.)6 
Historically, public utilities in New Zealand have been predominantly state-established, 
owned and run. State ownership was a means of ensuring the development and 
financing of socially important industries. 7 By the 1970s almost every utility service 
was provided by large State trading departments or divisions. These operated under 
statutory monopoly rights and were heavily regulated in terms of price-setting, 
investment planning, and other operating conditions. 
A The Electricity Industry Prior to 1986 
The Electricity Industry in New Zealand prior to the State sector reforms of the 1980s 
was a prime example of a State-owned and operated public utility, subject to extensive 
political control and involvement via government regulation. The Electricity Division 
of the Ministry of Energy ("NZED") was responsible for 96 per cent of electric 
generation, and for the national grid (transmission). 8 This monopoly in generation was 
entrenched by the Electricity Act 1968, which provided that the NZED was not required 
to hold a licence to generate electricity from hydro sources, but other generators using 
hydro as a resource required a licence from the govemment.9 
The balance of the generation capacity and responsibility for distribution was held by 
Electricity Supply Authorities (ESAs). ESAs were set up as statutory ad hoe bodies 
under the Electric Power Boards Act 1925, or as Municipal Electricity Departments of 
6 Terence Arnold The Courts, the Commerce Act and the Pricing of Access to Essential Facilities: Law 
and Economics at Work?, A paper delivered to the LEANZ Group, 5 December 1994, 2. 
7 The increasing role of the State in New Zealand ' s electricity industry prior to 1986 has been 
summarised in Appendix I. 
8 Geraldine Baumann, Bryan Gunderson and Quentin Hay "The Contractual Matrix in a Deregulated 
Electricity Industry", Conference of the Electric Power Supply Indust,y (Volume 2, Christchurch, 19-23 
September 1994 ), 122. 
9 Electricity Act 1968, s 20. 
POWERFUL REFORM: RESTRUCTURING THE NEW ZEALAND ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 1 Q 
Local Authorities under the Local Government Act 1974. In 1985 there were 44 local 
distribution and supply authorities, as compared to 93 in 1945, in a country of 3.2 
· 11 · 1 l 0 m1 10n peop e. 
The ESAs were local body owned, statutory monopolies. They held monopoly 
franchises in their areas for the distribution and retailing of electricity, and were 
required to buy from the NZED except where they had specific government 
exemptions. 11 ESAs generally operated with non profit-making and social service 
objectives, rather than a commercial focus. For example, they were obliged by statute 
to supply domestic consumers. 12 ESA boards were frequently involved in the day to 
day management of the organisations. Commercial customers generally subsidised 
domestic customers. 13 
Commercial interaction between the NZED and the ESAs was limited. The NZED 
provided electricity to the supply companies under the Bulk Supply Tariff, which was 
set annually by the government - an arrangement that was politically rather than 
commercially motivated. This reflected the government's duty under the Electricity Act 
1968 to supply all electricity needs. 
III THE HISTORICAL SOURCE OF PUBLIC UTILITY 
MONOPOLISATION 
A Inefficiency in the Public Sector 
Widespread concern about inefficiency in the public sector resulting from statutory 
monopolies, such as the NZED, was one factor stimulating the extensive public sector 
reform of the 1980s. In general, the losses that such monopolies impose on society are 
10 Tony Fenwick, Ministry of Commerce "A Competition Law Assessment of New Zealand's Electricity 
Reforms" Competition Law and Policy Institute of New Zealand Ninth Annual Workshop, 31 July - I 
August 1998, 2. 
11 Electricity Act 1968, s 26. 
12 Electrical Supply Regulations 1967, r 19(2); Electrical Supply Regulations 1984, r 17(2). 
13 Russell McGeorge "An Overview of the Reform of the Electricity Industry", Conference of the Electric 
Power Supply Industry (Volume 1, Christchurch, 19-23 September 1994), 173. 
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more likely to be associated with excessive prices and excessive costs than with a high 
level of reported profits. It is essential to understand the problems created by 
monopolies in order to understand the rationale behind the State sector reforms of the 
1980s . 
. The inefficiency of public sector enterprises in New Zealand - which covered, but were 
not limited to, utilities - imposed a heavy burden on the economy. In 1984 State-owned 
trading enterprises accounted for about 12 per cent of GDP, and for about 20 per cent of 
investment in the economy, but despite this they had very low rates of return. Since 
they often produced essential inputs used by firms in the private sector, their efficiency, 
price-setting and investment behaviour had a major impact on the competitiveness of 
the economy as a whole. 14 
B Natural Monopolies 
The term "natural monopoly" has traditionally been used to describe those industries in 
which only one firm operates (or has significant market dominance) due to 
characteristics endogenous to the industry, rather than due to some artificial property 
right such as a patent or licence. Other market entrants cannot economically duplicate 
their networks or produce the range of outputs at a lower cost than the monopolist 
because of the monopolist's large, lumpy immobile investments in sunk assets, and the 
scale economies derived from the network operations. The transmission and 
distribution sectors of the electricity industry are natural monopolies, although 
generation and retail are not usually considered to be so. 
Economic theory suggests that natural monopolies with significant market dominance 
may create public policy concerns because they may have higher production costs, they 
14 A Bollard and M Pickford "Utility Regulation in New Zealand" in ME Beesley (ed) Regulating 
Utilities: Broadening the Debate (Institute of Economic Affairs and London Business School, London, 
1997), 94 ("Utility Regulation in New Zealand"). 
POWERFUL REFORM: RESTRUCTURING THE NEW ZEALAND ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 12 
may charge higher prices, and they may innovate more slowly than firms subject to 
· · 15 compet1t1ve pressures. 
C State Sector Refonn 
As part of wider economic liberalisation policies, the public utility industries were 
progressively reformed in the years following 1985. The basic thrust of the State sector 
reforms was to free the market mechanism from distorting government controls and 
subsidies. The emphasis was on allowing the forces of enterprise, self-interest, and 
competition to generate efficiency and economic growth.
16 These reforms included: 
a) removal of statutory monopoly rights so as to expose utilities to competition and 
allow commercial criteria to provide a fair assessment of managerial performance; 
b) restructuring to separate responsibility for non-commercial or policy functions from 
trading functions; 
c) corporatisation and privatisation, to give commercial objectives and allow managers 
the responsibility for decisions on the use of inputs, on pricing, and on the marketing 
of their outputs; 17 
d) restructuring to isolate natural monopoly elements from contestable parts of 
industries and to reduce barriers to competition in the contestable parts of industries; 
15 Ministry of Commerce and The Treasury Regulation of Access to Vertically Integrated Natural 
Monopolies (Ministry of Commerce, Wellington, 1995), 4 ("Regulation of Access to Vertically Integrated 
Natural Monopolies'') . 
16 "Utility Regulation in New Zealand", above n 13, 79 
17 The analytical foundations of the corporatisation and deregulation policies lay in principal-agent 
theory. Principal-agent theory holds that life is a series of contracts between a principal and an agent and 
that these contracts require clear objectives, good information, monitoring and incentives to function 
effectively. Privatisation was driven by the ideology of the New Right - managerialism and the New 
Public Management ("NPM"). Managerialism involves the emulation in the public sector of the 
principles and practices of the private sector - "letting the managers manage". NPM also prefers private 
ownership and advocates the disaggregation of large bureaucratic structures into quasi-autonomous 
agencies, in particular the separation of commercial from non-commercial functions and policy advice 
from delivery and regulatory functions. 
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and 
e) abolition of social service obligations. 
The first major State sector reform in the pursuit of efficiency and accountability was 
the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 ("SOE Act"). The overriding statutory objective 
of each State-owned enterprise ("SOE") was to run a successful business as profitably 
and efficiently as comparable private sector businesses. 18 Under the SOE Act the 
Crown retained ownership of trading activities, but the enterprise was run by a 
government-appointed Board of Directors that was accountable to the shareholding 
ministers for the company's performance. 19 
D Deregulation of the Electricity Industry 
1 Generation and Transmission Sector Refonn 
These economic reforms were translated to the electricity industry over a number of 
years. Electricity reform began in the generation and transmission sector with the 
corporatisation of the NZED into the Electricity Corporation of New Zealand ("ECNZ") 
on 1 April 1987 under the SOE Act 1986. This was the beginning of a fundamental 
shift in policy towards treating electricity like a commodity and exposing the industry 
as much as possible to the forces of market competition.20 The government 
relinquished direct control over electricity pricing to ECNZ's Board of Directors. 
However, electricity supply provided as part of government social policy continued to 
be subsidised by the government, and did not form part of ECNZ's commercial 
objectives.21 This allowed transparency in the costing of supply and prevented ECNZ's 
responsible ministers from using the SOE for political motives. 
18 State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 4(l)(a). 
19 The Minister of Finance and the Minister of State-Owned Enterprises. 
20 Barry Barton "More Restructuring: the Government's New Proposals for Electricity Refonn" ( 1998) 2 
BRMB, 134. 
21 State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 7. 
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In 1988 Trans Power was set up as a separate corporate entity, a subsidiary of ECNZ, as 
part of the thrust towards separation of monopoly and potentially competitive elements. 
The policy was solidified in April 1994, when Trans Power was separated from ECNZ 
and established as an independent SOE, allowing competition to be introduced to the 
generation sector. 
In June 1995 the government announced that ECNZ would be split into two competing 
SOEs (ECNZ and Contact Energy), to enable greater competition in generation to 
develop. Contact received 28 per cent of New Zealand's total generating capacity, as 
well as ECNZ's rights to Maui Gas. Pursuant to a 1995 Memorandum of 
Understanding, EC Z was restricted from using its larger size to dominate the market. 
Special constraints on ECNZ - prohibiting it from acquiring any ESA (or any significant 
share in an ESA) - were to apply until ECNZ's market share of total generating capacity 
fell to 45 per cent. These constraints included a cap on building new capacity to ensure 
that at least 50 per cent of additional generating capacity in New Zealand was built by 
parties independent of ECNZ; the ring-fencing of new capacity; and a high level of firm 
capacity to be offered on long term contracts. 22 
In October 1996 the Wholesale Electricity Market ("NZEM") became fully operational, 
allowing a number of generators to offer varying amounts of electricity to a range of 
competing buyers. The NZEM comprises two different markets. The first is a physical 
spot market (pool) in which competing generators offer electricity, and buyers submit 
bids into the pool for each half hour period, resulting in clearing prices and quantities 
for dispatch by the scheduler, Trans Power. The second is a contracts market in which 
buyers and sellers can trade contracts for supply one day ahead which hedge against 
spot prices in the pool.23 
Financial hedges allow purchasers of electricity the ability to avoid price uncertainty. 
For example, ECNZ energy supply contracts provide for hedges against the week ahead 
22 Memorandum of Understanding entered into on 8 June 1995 by the Government of New Zealand and 
Electricity Corporation of New Zealand. 
23 Ministry of Commerce Chronology of New Zealand Electricity Reform (Ministry of Commerce, 
Wellington, 1998), I 0. 
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pnce. If the week ahead price is higher than the hedge price, ECNZ pays the customer 
the difference between the two prices to compensate the customer for the higher cost of 
electricity. If the week ahead price is lower than the hedge price, the customer pays 
ECNZ the difference between the two prices to compensate ECNZ for the lower price 
f 1 · · 24 o e ectnc1ty. Hedges are classified as futures contracts under the Securities 
Amendment Act 1988, since each party has a right to receive payment or credit of a sum 
of money, depending on whether the price is greater or lesser than the price agreed on at 
the time of the hedge. 25 
2 Retail and Supply Sector Reform 
The Energy Companies Act 1992 and the Electricity Act 1992 formed the initial 
legislative basis for the restructuring of the electricity supply sector. 
(a) The Energy Companies Act 1992 
The Energy Companies Act 1992 required corporatisation of the Electric Power Boards 
and Municipal Electricity Departments of Local Authorities, 26 whereby the assets of the 
utility operation were to be transferred to the company. Forty-four ESAs were 
corporatised under this Act.27 The government's initial intention was that all 
corporatised entities should be publicly listed. However, a range of ownership 
structures was adopted, including charitable trusts, consumer trusts, local government 
ownership and full public listing on the New Zealand Stock Exchange. Section 36(1) of 
24 See Commerce Commission Decision No. 277, 30/ 1/96. 
25 P Castle and S Watt "Regulatory and Contractual Requirements for Energy Price Risk Management 
Programmes", Electricity Price Risk (Wellington, Institute for International Research, 4 March 1997). 
26 Energy Companies Act 1992, Part IV. 
27 In the North Island these ESAs included; Top Energy, Northpower, Waitemata Electricity, Mercury 
Energy, Counties Power, Waikato Electricity, Valley Power, Tauranga Electric Power Board, Tauranga 
Electricity, Bay of Plenty Electricity, Eastland Energy, Waipa Power, Waitomo Energy Services, Rotorua 
Electricity, King Country Energy, Taupo Electricity, Wairoa Power, Hawke 's Bay Power, CHB Power, 
Powerco, Taranaki Energy, Egmont Electricity, CentralPower, ScanPower, Electro Power, Horowhenua 
Energy, Wairarapa Electricity, PowerDirect, Capital Power. 
In the South Island these ESAs included: Citipower, Marlborough Power, Tasman Energy, Buller 
Electricity, Westpower, MainPower, Southpower, Electricity Ashburton, Alpine Energy, Waitaki Power, 
Central Electric, Otago Power, Dunedin Electricity, The Power Company and Electricity lnvercargill. 
See McGeorge, above n 12, 174. 
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the Energy Companies Act imposed a commercial success requirement on all the new 
companies. 
(b) The Electricity Act 1992 
The Electricity Act 1992 provided for the deregulation of the retail sector, including the 
removal of statutory monopolies and the obligation to supply. It also removed the 
exclusive electricity supply franchise areas,28 abolished the right of electricity suppliers 
to enter private property to construct and maintain electrical works ( other than existing 
works) ,29 and provided for safety matters. 
Most importantly, the Electricity Act 1992 provided for information disclosure regimes 
focused on natural monopolies. 30 It required the compulsory public disclosure of 
certain annual financial and performance information pertaining to the power 
companies, and the accounting separation (ring-fencing) of the distribution business and 
the retailing business within each company. Finally, section 62 of the Electricity Act 
1992 required the compulsory maintenance of line services until 2013. 
3 Creation of Vertically Integrated Monopolies 
Corporatisation and privatisation of distribution companies occurred without divestment 
from the natural monopoly lines businesses, thereby creating "vertically integrated 
natural monopolies". Vertical integration occurs where a monopoly firm providing a 
monopoly service integrates into an upstream market, downstream market, a distinct 
horizontal market, or any combination of these. 31 
The only step the government took to prevent vertical integration in the electricity 
sector was to prohibit ECNZ from owning lines businesses. Lines businesses, however, 
were not prevented from owning generation assets. In the July 1995 Memorandum of 
28 Electricity Act 1992, s 71. 
29 Electricity Act 1992, s 23. 
30 Electricity Act 1992, s 170. 
31 Regulation of Access to Vertically Integrated Natural Monopolies, above n 15, 3-4. 
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Understanding with ECNZ,32 the government constrained ECNZ to offer the Cobb, 
Coleridge, Highbank, Matahina, Taui, Piripaua, and Kaitawa hydro-stations to regional 
energy companies. This was notwithstanding that, should energy companies purchase 
those stations, the vertically integrated character of the natural monopoly lines 
businesses would be further exaggerated. 
E Reform of Competition Law and Policy 
The revision of competition law and policy ran parallel to economic reform in New 
Zealand. A light-handed framework for the regulation of corporatised and privatised 
utilities with market power was adopted. This regime was heavily dependent on the 
Commerce Act 1986 ("the Commerce Act"), which defined the rules by which business 
were to operate in the newly deregulated economy. The Commerce Act aimed to deter 
the possible spread of restrictive practices and mergers by firms wishing to reduce what, 
for many, would be unfamiliar competition. Competition and competitive practices are: 
" ... by far the most effective means of protection against monopoly. Vigilance against 
anti-competitive practices is also important. Profit regulation is merely a "stop-gap" until 
sufficient competition develops". 33 
Effective competition involves real and vigorous rivalry between two or more parties to 
promote economic efficiency. Effective competition is achieved by aligning prices with 
costs, by increasing pressures for cost reduction, by selecting more efficient firms from 
less efficient firms, by promoting innovation, and by diminishing the inevitable 
imperfections of regulation. 34 Such competition in utilities might be thwarted by 
barriers to entry or anti-competitive behaviour by a dominant incumbent.35 
32 See above n 22. 
33 S Littlechild Regulation of British Telecommunications Profitability (HMSO, London, 1983), 9 I. 
34 John Vickers "Competition And Regulation: The UK Experience" in ME Beesley (ed) Regulating 
Utilities: A Time For Change? (Institute of Economic Affairs and London Business School, London, 
1996). 
35 See text at footnotes 54-63. 
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F Light-handed Regulation 
1 Policy 
Light-handed regulation reflects the market paradigm - its focus is on market 
participants determining their own solutions to issues of economic development and 
resource allocation with minimum interference from "regulators". This avoids both an 
industry-specific regulator and direct government control of prices. The framework is 
consistent with the view that it is competition, not regulation, that will, in time, succeed 
in driving down costs in a sustainable manner and overcoming the non-statutory entry 
barriers enjoyed by any dominant incumbent.36 
The Commerce Act is designed to promote market conditions where competition and 
economic efficiency can thrive.37 In Tru Tone Ltd v Festival Records Retail Marketing 
Ltd the Court of Appeal stated that the Commerce Act: 38 
" ... is based on the premise that societies' resources are best allocated in a competitive 
market where the rivalry between firms ensures maximum efficiency in the use of 
resources." 
This objective does not provide any impetus for the development of competition; it 
simply inhibits firms imposing their own restrictions, arrangements and practices which 
have an anti-competitive purpose or effect. However, this objective can be overridden 
in certain circumstances where efficiency advantages are considered to outweigh 
detriment from the loss of competition. The overall thrust of the policy is to encourage 
competition where markets are potentially contestable, and to focus regulation on the 
non-contestable markets controlled by incumbent utilities. 39 
36 New Zealand Business Round table Regularion of Network Industries: The Case of Telecommunications 
<http://www .nzbr-org.nz/pdf-format/PDF-006-network/nzbr _network _industries.pdf, 1998>, 42. 
37 Commerce Act 1986, Title: "An Act to promote competition in markets within New Zealand and to 
repeal the Commerce Act 1975". 
38 
[ 1988] 2 NZLR 352, 358 (CA). 
39 "Utility Regulation in ew Zealand", above n 14, 98. 
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The Commerce Act is generic legislation governing competition in all industries, and 
with a focus on regulating the behaviour of firms. It is administered by a politically 
independent body - the Commerce Commission - whose decisions can be appealed 
through the Courts. 
2 Components of Light-handed Regulation 
Light-handed regulation consists of three components:40 
a) Information disclosure, to create transparency in the performance of businesses 
with market power, to encourage self-regulation and to provide recourse to the 
provisions of the Commerce Act; 
b) Use of Part II of the Commerce Act (restrictive trade practices provisions) to 
deal with anti-competitive behaviour, including the possibility of court action by 
private parties or the Commerce Commission; and 
c) The threat of further regulation, such as the introduction of price control, if 
market dominance is abused. 
(a) lnfonnation Disclosure 
Information disclosure is a technique designed to discourage monopoly pncmg, 
uneconomic electricity generation, and excessive cross-subsidies between consumer 
classes. It is intended to foster competition in an industry by promoting open access to 
natural monopolies, exposing predatory pricing and revealing any cross-subsidies 
between natural monopoly and competitive activities. 41 
40 
Ministry of Commerce, Energy and Resources Division, Energy Policy Group Light-Handed 
Regulation of New Zealand 's Electricity and Gas Industries (Ministry of Commerce, Wellington, 
October 1995), 1 ("Light-Handed Regulation"), I. 
41 Light-Handed Regulation, above n 40, 4. 
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This approach was implemented in the electricity industry by the Electricity 
(Information Disclosure) Regulations 1994, which required participants in the 
electricity industry to publicly disclose information about their activities. These 
regulations apply to ECNZ as well as its subsidiaries, electricity generators, retailers 
and distributors, subject to exemptions granted by the Secretary of Commerce. They 
call for public disclosure of: 
a) separate audited financial statements for natural monopoly and potentially 
competitive businesses within five months after the end of each financial year; 
b) prices and other main terms and conditions of contracts; 
c) financial performance measures, based on standard asset values (Optimised Deprival 
Value/2 and with removal of any elements of double counting of asset related 
expenditure; 
d) efficiency and reliability performance measures; 
e) costs and revenues by tariff category (and methodologies); and 
f) line charges (and methodologies). 
Information is publicly disclosed by publication in the Gazette, by making information 
available for inspection at the principal trading offices, or by providing information on 
request. In this manner the Electricity (Information Disclosure) Regulations 1994 aim 
to encourage self-regulation through the market, thereby underpinning the effectiveness 
of the Commerce Act. The availability of the information is also intended to increase 
transparency, enabling participants in the electricity industry and others to detect and 
challenge anti-competitive conduct. 
42 Optimised Deprival Value (ODV) is the lesser of Optimised Depreciated Replacement Cost (ODRC) 
and Economic Value (net present value of future cash flows). 
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(b) Part II of the Commerce Act 1986 
Under section 27 of the Commerce Act, contracts, arrangements or understandings that 
have "the purpose or effect of substantially lessening competition" are prohibited. 
Section 30 deems a contract, arrangement or understanding that has the "purpose or 
effect of fixing, controlling or maintaining prices" for goods to be one that substantially 
lessel}s competition. The significance of section 30 is that it removes any need to 
establish that competition has been substantially lessened, which is usually the main 
ground on which section 27 allegations are defended. 
Section 36 is probably the most important provision for regulation of utilities. It 
prohibits firms from using their dominant positions for the purpose of restricting, 
preventing, deterring or eliminating competition. The Privy Council decision in 
Telecom Co,poration Limited v Clear Communications Limitec/'3 has significantly 
reduced the effectiveness of section 36 by restricting the definition of "use" of 
dominance. The test for "use" is now whether a dominant firm, otherwise in the same 
circumstances as the dominant firm, but not in a dominant position, would act in the 
same way. 
However, the charging of a "monopoly price" in itself is not prohibited, although the 
inference is that monopoly profits should be competed away where entry is possible.44 
Contravention of the Part II provisions attracts serious sanctions. An individual 
contravener may be liable for penalties of up to $500,000, and a corporate contravener 
may be liable for up to $5,000,000.45 Court injunctions may be granted to restrain 
future contraventions,46 and a contravener may be liable to compensate any person who 
suffers loss.47 
43 [1995] 1 NZLR 385; (1994) 5 NZBLC 103,552; (1994) 6 TCLR 138; (1994) 32 IPR 573. 
44 Clear Communications Limited v Telecom Co1poration Limited ( 1993) 4 NZBLC l 03,340, I 03 ,344 
(CA). 
45 Commerce Act 1986, ss 80,83. 
46 Commerce Act 1986, Part VI. 
47 Commerce Act 1986, s 89. 
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( c) Part IV of the Commerce Act - Price Control 
Part IV of the Commerce Act is a "sword" that hangs over firms operating in markets 
with limited competition.48 It provides the threat of imminent regulation to ensure 
players in the industry act in good faith. If the light-handed approach is perceived as 
being ineffective, the threat is that the government will adopt a more "heavy handed" 
approach and fix the prices for particular components in the industry. 
The Commerce Act makes provision in Part IV for the imposition of price control in 
circumstances of restricted competition. The Minister of Commerce may recommend to 
the Governor-General that the prices for goods or services be controlled where he or she 
is satisfied that the relevant goods will be supplied in a market in which competition is 
limited or is likely to be lessened, and where it is necessary for the price of those goods 
or services to be controlled in the interests of users or consumers. This should act as a 
deterrent to abuse of market dominance. 
IV THE IMPACT OF STATE SECTOR AND COMPETITION LAW REFORMS 
A Positive Results of the Refonns 
A certain amount of competition was introduced to the electricity generation and retail 
sectors following the economic reforms of the 1980s, particularly after the advent of the 
wholesale electricity market. The success of the electricity industry reforms of the early 
1990s is apparent in a comparison of delivered power price increases. Power prices to 
New Zealand's domestic users have not risen as sharply as those in our OECD 
counterpart countries since 1992. According to the Energy Data File for 1997, 
compiled by the Ministry of Commerce, New Zealand's electricity prices were the 
fourth lowest in the world, behind Mexico and Canada (with huge gas resources for 
cheap generation) and Norway (with a massive hydro storage resource).49 
48 Dr Alan Bollard, Chairman, Commerce Commission "Regulation of Competition in the Electricity 
Industry" in Institute for International Research Conference on Exploiting Opportunities and Future 
Developments in Electricity Rationalisation (Institute for International Research, Auckland, 29 March 
1995), 11. 
49 
Ministry of Commerce Energy Data File (Ministry of Commerce, Wellington, July 1997, January 
1998). 
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B Unresolved Problems 
1 Problems in Generation 
A range of problems continue to exist in today's electricity generation, distribution and 
supply businesses. In generation these include continuing ECNZ dominance in the spot 
and contracts markets, which has caused spot and contract prices to be significantly 
higher than they would be in a fully competitive market. 50 Although ECNZ's wholesale 
electricity price has fallen 14.7 per cent in real terms since 1989, aggregate retail prices 
rose by 5.6 per cent in the 1995/96 year. 51 Obviously, reduced wholesale prices have 
not been reflected in domestic electricity prices. A further problem is that of over 
capacity resulting from premature committal of generation investment: 52 
"Since 1995 some 1,350 MW of new, base load, generating capacity has been committed to 
construction or commissioned. This represents a substantial increment in new generating 
capacity and the bulk of it will be designated to operate at full load on a continuous basis ... 
All of this plant will be in operation by the year 2000 and will add some I 0,000 G Wh to 
annual base load energy production ... This excess of supply over demand is likely to place 
substantial competitive pressure over the next few years on the higher cost, older 
technology power stations in the ECNZ and Contact portfolio." 
2 Problems in Distribution and Supply 
While the earlier electricity distribution and supply reforms have improved efficiency in 
the industry they have not benefited smaller consumers. At present the level of retailing 
competition is low - only three per cent of all electricity generated is traded across 
50 Ministry of Commerce "A Better Deal for Electricity Consumers": An Outline of the New Zealand 
Government's Electricity Reform Package (Ministry of Commerce, 
http://www.moc.govt.nz/ran/empg/blueprint/blueprintOO.html, 7 April 1998), 3 ( "A Better Deal for 
Electricity Consumers"). 
51 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Limited Annual Report. Year Ended 30 June 1997 
~Wellington, 1997), 5. 
2 Keith Turner and Kieran Murray Report for OCEP- Competition in Electricity Generation - Options 
for a Further Split of ECNZ, (Wellington, August 1997) 18-20. 
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regional monopoly boundaries.53 In particular, there are two recognised concerns with 
the status quo that reveal the inadequacy of New Zealand's light-handed regulatory 
regime in promoting competition, and in ensuring that gains from further generation 
reform will be passed on to consumers, namely: 
a) the vertical integration of lines businesses with electricity businesses. This permits 
cross-subsidisation and bundling of prices and services by electricity supply 
companies such as to discourage entry by independent retailers. This gives an 
unreasonable advantage to incumbent electricity supply companies. It also means 
that electricity supply companies are, in more general terms, open to high perverse 
economic incentives to use access issues to discourage entry by independent 
retailers ; and 
b) the ability of the owners of natural monopoly lines businesses to extract monopoly 
profits from both end-consumers, as well as those independent energy retailers 
("independent retailers") who use their distribution lines to retail electricity. 
3 Specific Unresolved Problems 
(a) Access issues 
A key issue smce deregulation has been the ability of power compames and 
independent retailers to supply electricity to new customers via each others' distribution 
networks. Access issues arise when a firm, which desires to enter and compete in the 
electricity market, must have access to the facilities owned by the incumbent competitor 
in order to compete in that market. The incumbent firm may be unwilling to avail its 
facilities to potential competitors and may either refuse to make lines available, or make 
them available on restrictive terms and conditions in "use of systems" agreements. 54 
Therefore, small consumers are confined to purchasing delivered electricity from their 
incumbent retailer. 
53 Hon Winston Peters, Treasurer; Rt Hon Bill Birch, Minister of Finance; Hon Max Bradford, Minister 
of Energy "A Better Deal For Consumers. Electricity Reforms" (media release, 7 April 1998), 3. 
54 Cabinet Committee on Enterprise, Industry and Environment Regulation of Access to Natural 
Monopolies (CIE (96) 86, Wellington, 13 June 1996), 2. 
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The current system of metering, reconciliation and other transaction costs precludes 
small consumers from being supplied by competing retailers "wheeling" electricity over 
distribution networks. 55 This is because time-of-use metering renders small commercial 
and domestic energy use uneconomic. To date, regulatory policy has sought to address 
this problem by controlling the extent to which a lines business can discriminate in 
favour of its own associated retail activity. This generally involves an entrant's threat 
of litigation under the Commerce Act and reliance on information disclosure to monitor 
the existing regime. 
The Commerce Act has not proved effective in handling access disputes. Section 36 of 
the Commerce Act was considered in Telecom Corporation Limited v Clear 
Communications Limited, 56 in which the Privy Council held that Telecom's insistence 
upon a price for access given by the "Baumol-Willig" rule was lawful under section 36. 
Essentially, the Baumol-Willig rule states that a firm seeking access should pay the 
incumbent a sum sufficient to compensate it for the opportunity cost of customers lost 
to the entrant, including its forgone profits, if any. 57 A Baumol-Willig access price 
may, therefore, include the monopoly profits that the incumbent loses by selling access 
in place of retail line services. 
Although the Baumol-Willig rule is legal in New Zealand following Telecom v Clear, it 
is not current government policy. Ministerial disavowal of the rule creates considerable 
uncertainty when negotiating access to lines networks and provides additional 
bargaining power to the incumbent, essentially allowing it to charge Baumol-Willig 
rates. 58 
55 In the retail wheeling model, players in the distribution market may contract directly with the end-
customer and use the local line business to "wheel" power directly to the end-customer. With effective 
retail wheeling, the retail distribution market is opened up to a wide variety of participants, including 
energy companies, brokers and marketeers, municipalities and other Government entities, retailers, 
generators, non-profit groups and consumer groups. See Mercury Energy Limited v Power New Zealand 
Limited (Commerce Commission Decision No. 317, 26/2/98), para I O 1. 
56 Above n 43. 
57 Cabinet Committee on Enterprise, Industry and Environment, above n 54, 8. 
58 Quentin Hay and Martin Taylor Enhancing Competition in the New Zealand Electricity Market, 
Particularly at the End-User (Retail) Level. Discussion Paper Prepared for the Electricity Corporation 
of New Zealand Limited (Bell Gully Buddle Weir, Wellington, 13 November 1997), 16. 
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Reliance on actions under the Commerce Act is also problematic because of the length 
and expense of litigation (itself potentially a barrier to entry that can be exploited by 
incumbent monopolists); and the inadequacy of penalties ordered under the Commerce 
Act to deter anti-competitive conduct. 
The most recent competition action concerning access by competing electricity retailers 
to existing networks was brought by the Commerce Commission against Southpower. 
The Commerce Commission alleged that Southpower was using a dominant position in 
the market for purposes in breach of section 36 in terms of: 59 
(i) requiring persons whose premises were connected to their distribution network 
to enter a line services contract, whether or not Southpower actually supplied 
electricity to that person, thereby using their dominant position anti-
competitively; 
(ii) overstating charges to competing electricity retailers for use of distribution 
networks by overstating the true cost of the network distribution business and 
understating the true economic cost of its electricity retailing business; 
allocating over 90 per cent of its trading costs to its network distribution 
business; and allocating all its metering and billing services costs to the network 
distribution business; and 
(iii) requiring competing electricity retailers to enter a conveyance agreement. 
The case was settled out of Court in April 1998 when Southpower agreed not to contest 
the Commission's allegation that aspects of their terms of access for competing energy 
traders breached the Commerce Act. Southpower also agreed to some relatively minor -
in terms of their competitive impacts - modifications to other business practices.60 
59 
Commerce Commission v Southpower Limited ( 1997) 8 TCLR 6. 
60 
Deed of Settlement Between Commerce Commission and Southpower, 2 April 1998. These 
modifications included "ring fencing" and reducing the scope of the natural monopoly element of 
Southpower's business; placing contestable activities in separate corporate entities to facilitate the 
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(b) Cross-subsidisation and bundling 
Vertically integrated power companies are able to cross-subsidise competitive activities 
such as retailing and generation from their captive lines customers. Cross-subsidisation 
involves direct and indirect transfer payments between lines and energy businesses, 
including the provision of discounted goods or services; and cross-allocation of costs, 
revenues, assets and liabilities between the businesses (particularly for potentially 
contestable operations, such as billing and metering). Costs may be associated with a 
wide spectrum of activities, from research and development costs through to costs 
associated with defending hostile takeovers. 
Further illustrations of cross-subsidisation involve the operation of a lines business in a 
manner that favours the energy business - but that may not be in the best interests of the 
lines business itself - encompassing such matters as maintenance of distribution lines 
and timing of outages; and risk allocation between lines and energy businesses in such 
areas as contracting and financing activities. 
Greater transparency of cross-subsidisation practices has not been achieved through the 
Electricity (Information Disclosure) Regulations 1994, as intended. Information 
disclosure as a means of light-handed regulation has instead encouraged innovative 
practices in vertically integrated power companies, designed to thwart the intent of the 
Electricity (Information Disclosure) Regulations 1994. For example, cross-
subsidisation has been facilitated by electricity distributors' ability to inflate Optimised 
Deprival Value ("ODV") of the electricity lines business (thereby increasing the amount 
payable by a competitor wishing to use their lines),61 and by unclear regulatory 
guidelines for the allocation of costs between energy and lines businesses. 
The public and officials also face difficulty in determining, from the information 
disclosed under the Regulations, whether cross-subsidisation is actually occurring. For 
development of effective competition in respect of those activities; and to facilitate adherence to the 
competitive p_arity principle in the setting of terms of access to the network for independent retailers . 
61 See text at footnote 42. 
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example, in Power New Zealand Limited v Mercury Energy Limited and Commerce 
Commission62 the High Court commented: 
"These Regulations are designed to make line charging more transparent. However, one 
would have to be a very well-informed consumer to be in a position to make much sense 
out of this highly complex information required to be furnished." 
The - case involved an appeal by Power New Zealand against the Commerce 
Commission's decision to allow Mercury Energy, New Zealand's largest power 
company, to acquire 100 per cent of the shares in Power New Zealand, the country's 
second largest power company. The case was finally decided in the Privy Council, 
where it was noted that information disclosure does not simplify the process of making 
meaningful comparisons between power companies' activities (the desired intent of the 
Electricity (Information Disclosure) Regulations 1994).63 The Privy Council said: 
"The regulations allow a degree of differing interpretation by each power company in 
defin ing what makes up each business and how costs and assets should be allocated 
between the line and energy (or other) businesses of the power company .... However, the 
ability to make inter-company comparisons is also handicapped by the different size, 
customer mix, and geography of the power companies." 
The Privy Council thought it unnecessary to consider the extent to which the 
information disclosure regime provides a constraint upon power companies. The 
decisive point was that the elimination of Power New Zealand would have very little 
effect upon the availability of comparative material, both within New Zealand and 
internationally. Post-acquisition, each company would continue to report separately for 
information disclosure purposes, but disclosure would be less meaningful as a result of 
the greater level of common ownership. The Privy Council also considered that 
TransAlta and Southpower would provide useful comparisons with the post-acquisition 
entity. 
62 
[ 1996] I NZLR 686, 694. 
63 
Mercury Energy Limited v Power New Zealand Limited (Commerce Commission Decision No. 317, 
26/2/98), para 129. 
POWERFUL REFORM: RESTRUCTURING THE NEW ZEALAND ELECTRIC/TY INDUSTRY 29 
(c) Monopoly profits 
The existence of monopoly allows "excess" profits to be earned by the organisation 
possessing market power because monopolies reduce output and raise prices to 
maximise profits. In the electricity industry monopoly profits are enhanced by the 
inelastic demand curves created by universal appliance ownership and the requirement 
for electricity to power these appliances. 
V THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY REFORM ACT 1998 
A Overview of the Electricity Industry Refonn Act 1998 
The Act was passed on 3 July 1998 within a very tight time frame. The select 
committee process took place over a three day period. Its terms of reference allowed 
only technical and implementation issues to be reviewed, as opposed to the substantive 
policy behind the Act. A total of 224 submissions were received by the Commerce 
Select Committee, 101 of which were presented orally. The majority of the submissions 
opposed the legislation. The Act is extremely complicated and as yet there is little 
published commentary on its provisions. For this reason an examination of its content 
may aid understanding and is essential to further the thesis of this paper. The obvious 
policy incentives for the Act will be highlighted in a discussion of the purpose 
provisions, and of the means by which the Act fulfils these purposes. Certain blatant 
legal questions and problems will be considered in discussion of the core provisions 
However, at the time of writing the significance of these potential problems is uncertain 
and conjecture would be inappropriate. 
1 Policy Overview 
The problems identified in the current generation, distribution and supply structures 
provided the impetus for further reform of the electricity sector. According to the 7 
April 1998 Reform Outline,64 the government's overall energy policy is to ensure that: 
M Ministry of Commerce "A Better Deal for Electricity Consumers": An Outline of the New Zealand 
Government's Electricity Reform Package (Ministry of Commerce, 
http://www.moc.govt.nz/ran/empg/blueprint/blueprintO I .html, 7 April 1998),2. 
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a) electricity is available when required by consumers; 
b) electricity is produced at the lowest possible cost to the economy as a whole; 
and 
c) harm to the environment is minimised. 
The Minister for Enterprise and Commerce, Max Bradford claimed: 
"The reforms are designed to kick along the pace of competition and choice for consumers" 
65 
"The contents of this Bill reflect the Government's commitment to delivering world best 
practice electricity services to all New Zealanders. The electricity reforms are about 
getting a better deal for consumers, especially household consumers. The electricity 
reforms will deliver choice and lower electricity prices. In this way the Government is also 
seeking to improve New Zealand's international competitiveness by significantly lowering 
energy costs for business."66 
The risks of barriers to distribution lines and of the cross-subsidisation of energy and 
lines businesses were to be addressed through separating ownership of the monopoly 
lines businesses and the potentially competitive supply businesses. It was envisaged 
that this structural solution would allow: 67 
vigorous [retail] competition wherever possible, combined with an effective 
regulatory regime where competition is not possible, most notably in the transmission and 
distribution (lines) business." 
Other stated objectives of government included facilitating the amalgamation of energy 
businesses and of lines businesses and delivering a low cost option to enable small 
consumers to switch electricity suppliers. If the industry is unable to deliver a low cost 
switching option within twelve months, the government plans to regulate for a 
mandatory default switching system and increase the threat of price control of line 
65 Max Bradford, Media Release, 7 April 1998. 
66 (19 May 1998) 568 ZPD, 9151. 
67 
"A Better Dea/for Electricity Consumers , above n 50, 1. 
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charges through the Commerce Commission. However, the system of agreements 
entered into between suppliers for lower cost rules to assess half hourly electricity 
consumption, and the proposal of data reconciliation as a low cost switching option is 
beyond the scope of discussion in this paper. 
2 Ownership Separation versus Corporate Separation 
To a certain extent the recent reforms were foreshadowed by earlier restructuring 
attempts. In 1995 the government expressed its concern at the ability of owners of 
natural monopoly distribution lines to stifle retail competition. In particular, the 
government issued a statement that was emphasised by the proponents of the Act:
68 
"If there is a clear and consistent pattern of abuse of natural monopoly line businesses, the 
Government would seriously consider requiring the ownership of line businesses to be 
separated from ownership of competitive activities, such as generation and energy 
retailing". 
The government's decision to split lines and energy businesses was influenced by 
overseas developments . A recent OECD report has given credence to ownership 
separation as a means to preventing vertically-integrated natural monopolies from using 
their market power in distribution to exclude competition. The report noted that:
69 
" ... restructuring ownership and changes in regulatory institutions are likely to be 
prerequisites for the introduction of competition especially if the industry is likely to be 
highly concentrated horizontally and vertically integrated." 
Reforms in the UK gas markets that resulted in the ownership separation of British Gas, 
thereby promoting competition and regulatory effectiveness were also persuasive. 
British Gas originally had the integrated functions of sale of gas and ownership of the 
monopoly gas transportation system. The British Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
68 
Government Policy Statement Wholesale Electricity Reform. Regulation of Electricity Lines 
Businesses (Wellington, 8 June 1995). 
69 OECD Report on Regulatory Reform Volume I, Sectoral Studies, 165. The weaknesses of accounting 
separation can be found on page 173. 
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(MMC) perceived this integrated role to be generating a conflict of interest, 
extinguishing the conditions necessary for self-sustaining competition. The dual role 
inhibited choice, restricted innovation, and led to higher levels of gas prices than would 
otherwise have been the case. British Gas proposed a corporate split - the establishment 
of separate trading and transportation units under its common ownership. The MMC 
considered this proposal inadequate to remedy the restrictions on competition and 
recommended the divestment of British Gas's trading activities. The MMC said: 
"Such a measure [divestment] would not, in our view, put at risk security of supply or 
safety. It would involve considerably less costs and organisational change than many other 
remedies put to us. Although some increase in costs in the short term may result, the 
development of self-sustaining competition would bring significant benefits to consumers. 
We regard separation of the businesses as essential to ensure that transportation and storage 
can be made available to all shippers, including the trading activity currently carried out by 
British Gas, without undue discrimination. Such a measure would remove the existing 
conflicts of interest, provide the incentives necessary to ensure the neutrality of 
transportation and storage, and bring about the transparency necessary for the regulation of 
the system." 
3 Expression of Policy Considerations 
The most obvious policy considerations were drafted into the Act in the broad purpose 
provisions. Section 2 provides that the purpose of the Act is to reform the electricity 
industry to better ensure that -
( 1 )(a) Costs and prices in the electricity industry are subject to sustained downward pressure; 
and 
(b) The benefits of efficient electricity pricing flow through to all classes of consumers -
by-
(c) Effectively separating electricity distribution from generation and retail; and 
(d) Promoting effective competition in electricity generation and retail. 
(2) The particular purpose of Parts I to 5 (separation of lines and supply) is -
(a) To prohibit certain involvements in electricity lines businesses and electricity supply 
businesses which may create incentives and opportunities -
(i) To inhibit competition in the electricity industry; or 
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(ii) To cross-subsidise generation activities from electricity lines businesses; 
and 
(b) To restrict relationships between electricity lines businesses and electricity supply 
businesses which may otherwise not be at arms length. 
(3)The particular purpose of Part 6 (price restraint) is to enable, in the event of a change in 
charges for line function services, the protection of domestic and rural consumers against a rate 
of change and level of change that is inappropriate. 
( 4) The particular purpose of Part 7 ( amendments to Electricity Act 1992) is to facilitate 
competition among electricity retailers and choice for consumers. 
(5) The particular purpose of Part 8 (split of ECNZ) is to promote effective competition in 
electricity generation by enabling the shareholding Ministers of Electricity Corporation of New 
Zealand Limited to require assets and liabilities of that company or of any wholly-owned 
subsidiary of that company to be transferred to the Crown or to any other State enterprise or 
subsidiaries of State enterprises. 
3 Retrospective Provisions 
Certain provisions of the Act had retrospective effect, backdated to 23 June 1998. From 
that time no person70 may at any time do anything to defeat the broadly defined 
purposes of the Act;71 no person is entitled to compensation from the government for 
any loss, damage or taxation liability arising from the Act; 72 and the enforcement and 
penalty provisions of the Act apply.73 The provision in section 69 disallowing 
compensation for any real or perceived damage or loss, or any tax liability arising out of 
the operation of the Act, has provoked considerable debate and will be discussed in the 
following section. 
B Ownership Split for Energy Companies 
Ownership separation is the crux of the reform. 74 The legislative approach to ownership 
separation involves a two-stage process. Vertically integrated power companies must 
70 A "person" is a natural person or a legal entity and includes the trustees of a trust acting in that 
capacity. 
71 Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998 ("EIR Act"), s 68. 
72 EIR Act, above n 71, s 69. 
73 EIR Act, above n 71, ss 47-59. 
74 EIR Act, above n 71, Parts 1 to 5 provide for the separation of electricity lines and supply for the 
purposes set out in section 2(2): 
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choose which business they will continue to be involved in. The Act requires the assets 
of electricity businesses to be classified into either: 
1) an electricity lines business, which is a business that conveys electricity by line 
in New Zealand and which includes the ownership or operation, directly or 
indirectly, of electricity lines in New Zealand or any other core assets of an 
- electricity lines business;75 or 
2) an electricity supply business, which is a business that sells or generates 
electricity, sells financial hedges for electricity price risks, or that trades in 
rights to sell or generate electricity in New Zealand. A supply business 
includes 76 the ownership or operation, ( directly or indirectly), of an electricity 
generator in New Zealand or any other core generation assets;77 and the 
ownership or operation ( directly or indirectly) of any core assets of an electricity 
retail business. The core assets include the customer database, the benefits of 
contracts to sell electricity, and the benefits of non-competition undertakings.78 
Exemptions to what constitutes an electricity supply business are provided for in section 
5(2) for minimal volumes (selling or generating less than 2.5 GWh per annum), own or 
local consumption and independence from the national grid. 
In its first reading, the Electricity Industry Reform Bill provided that persons selling or 
generating less than 0.5 GWh per annum were exempt from the definition of electricity 
supply businesses. Several small communities, including Haast, Milford, the Chatham 
Islands and Stewart Island opposed this provision in the Select Committee hearing. 
(2) The particular purpose of Parts I to 5 (separation of lines and supply) is -
(a) To prohibit certain involvements in electricity lines businesses and electricity supply 
businesses which may create incentives or opportunities -
(i) To inhibit competition in the electricity industry; or 
(ii) To cross-subsidise generation activities from electricity lines businesses; and 
(b) To restrict relationships between electricity lines businesses and electricity supply businesses 
which may not otherwise be at arms length. 
75 EIR Act, above n 71 , s 4( I )(a),(b ). 
76 EIR Act, above n 71, s 5( I )(a). 
77 EIR Act, above n 71, s 5( 1 )(b ). 
78 EIR Act, above n 71, s 5(l)(c). 
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Haast Electricity submitted that the measures proposed by the Bill were inappropriate 
and that the company should be exempt from this definition. 
The company gave various reasons for this submission: 
79 
"The Haast electrical network is remote from the national grid ... there is little or no 
likelihood of the Haast network ever being connected to a grid or other incoming supply ... 
The company services its 216 customers with approximately 80 kilometres of aerial 
transmission line. The primary source of energy production is the Turnbull Hydro Electric 
power station which is capable of generating a maximum of 890 kilowatts .. . Annual energy 
distribution is currently averaging 2.5 GWh - well above the threshold published in the 
Electricity Industry Reform Bill." 
Rather than provide exemptions for specific power companies in the Act, the result of 
the submissions made by these small communities was that the minimum sale and 
generation volumes were increased. 
1 Interim Exemptions to Compliance with Ownership Separation 
A series of interim exemptions means that immediate compliance with the ownership 
separation rules is not necessary in relation to certain existing and new arrangements. 
Section 30 forbids the expansion of cross-involvements prohibited by the ownership 
separation rules. However, sections 28 to 45 of the Act provide interim exemptions, 
rules and specific options for complying with the ownership separation rules. These 
apply over a five-year transitional period:80 
a) Section 28 allows a person to be exempted until 1 January 2004 from the ownership 
separation rules for existing cross-involvements ( corporate separation must still 
occur); 
79 Haast Electricity Submission to the Commerce Committee on the Electricity Industry Reform Bill, 2 
June 1998, 2-3. 
80 EIR Act, above n 71, s 2. 
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b) Section 29 provides an exemption until 1 January 2004 for acquisitions of all or part 
of one person's cross-involvement by a person with no interest in an electricity 
business; 
c) Section 31 provides an exemption for expanding cross-involvements in a single 
unseparated electricity business, provided the exempt person has no involvement in 
any other electricity business; 
d) Sections 32 and 33 provide exemptions for Treaty of Waitangi related matters and 
section 34 exempts companies with direct ownership; and 
e) Section 35 provides an expansion option until 1 July 1999 for a person that wishes 
to expand that person's involvement in one or more electricity companies before 
ownership separation. 
The transitional provisions are likely to be contentious. For example, section 35 is 
intended to give companies flexibility in divesting their current involvements, and to 
provide incentives for early compliance with the ownership provisions by persons 
taking this option. However, it is an onerous requirement because such persons must by 
1 July 1999 meet the ownership separation rules, or sell down to the level of 
involvement that existed as at 23 June 1998. In addition, the transfer of interests must 
be completed by 1 April 2000. Parties wishing to take advantage of this opportunity 
must notify the Commerce Commission. 81 
One example of the problems inherent in the section 35 time requirement became 
apparent in September 1998. On 25 September 1998 three power companies - Powerco, 
CentralPower and TrustPower - stated they would not proceed with a proposal to merge 
their generation and energy retailing businesses into a new company, National Power, 
as had been announced on 25 June 1995.82 According to Mr Bradford: 83 
81 EIR Act, above n 71 , s 35(l)(e),(f). 
82 
James Weir "Merger Creates Giant Power Company", The Dominion , Wellington, ew Zealand, 26 
June 1998 , 15 . 
83 
"Bradford response to Powerco-Central Power Statement", media release, 24 September 1998 . 
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"It is not correct to say that late changes to the Electricity Industry reform Act mean power 
companies must ownership separate their lines and retail/generation businesses by I July 
1999. Firms still have until the end of 2000 to do this if they choose to do so. Power 
companies are only required to ownership separate by I July next year if they expand 
through mergers and takeovers in the meantime. While this requirement did apply to the 
National Power proposal, it has not stopped other companies getting on with the job." 
C Two Stage Separation Procedure 
The interim exemptions are removed m accordance with a two-stage procedure for 
separation: 
1) by 1 April 1999 electricity companies must achieve co,porate separation 
( electricity lines business and electricity supply business must be carried on by 
different companies). Electricity trusts must implement mirror trust separation 
by this deadline. 
2) by 1 January 2004 (a five-year period in which to achieve compliance) 
electricity companies must achieve ownership separation. No company may be 
"involved" in both businesses, and companies must elect either to adopt a mirror 
trust option for ownership ( each business is to be owned by community trusts, 
each with the same beneficiaries), or to dispose of one of the businesses. 
However, electricity trusts that have implemented mirror trust separation by 1 
April 1999 are exempt from this deadline and may continue in a state of mirror 
trust separation indefinitely, provided they comply with the Act. 84 
1 The First Deadline - 1 April 1999 
There are two possible options for compliance with the first stage of ownership 
separation - mirror trust separation and corporate separation. Both options are subject 
to the Arms Length Rules found in Schedule One of the Act. 
84 EIR Act, above n 71, s 43 subject to s 45. 
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(a) Arms Length Rules85 
Section 25 of the Act allows a company to carry on its electricity lines business and 
electricity supply business in different companies but with common ownership until 1 
January 2004 - provided that the two businesses are operated entirely separately. The 
arms length rules take effect over a 12 month phase-in period beginning on 1 April 
1999,86 and amount to a de facto ownership split for the transition period prior to sale. 
In essence, the Arms Length Rules: 87 
i) prevent a lines business g1vmg the formerly associated energy business any 
preference and vice versa; 88 
ii) prevent a lines business discriminating against the competitors of the formerly 
associated energy business in favour of the formerly associated energy business 
and vice versa;89 
iii) reqmre directors and managers of the lines business to have regard to the 
interests of their own business only, and not those of the formerly associated 
energy business, and vice versa;90 
iv) require separate management of the lines and energy businesses;91 
85 The Arms Length Rules regulate all direct or indirect relationships, dealings and transactions between 
electricity supply businesses and electricity lines businesses. The Arms Length Rules are contained in a 
schedule to the Act and may be amended by governmental regulation if necessary. 
86 EIR Act, above n 71, s 26. 
87 EIR Act, above n 7 I , Schedule I. 
88 EIR Act, above n 7 I, Schedule I , cl 2(3). 
89 EIR Act, above n 7 I, Schedule I , cl 2( 4 ). 
90 EIR Act, above n 7 I, Schedule 1, cl 2( 6) . 
91 EIR Act, above n 7 I, Schedule I, cl 2(7). 
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v) prohibit disclosure of information "that could put (the other business) in a 
position of material advantage in relation to any competitor or potential 
competitor" (if separate ownership); 92 
vi) require a register of dealings between the lines and energy business.
93 
(b) . Practical Complications Resulting from the Arms Length Rules 
As power companies endeavour to meet these requirements, the effect of the Arms 
Length Rules on system integration, on the definition of accountabilities and liabilities, 
and on supply security to consumers, is potentially serious. The most significant 
problems are likely to result from the information flow restrictions. Impeding data 
flows may operate to prevent one half of an existing power company making the other 
half aware that energy traders are having trouble maintaining local system balances, or 
that certain customers should be turned off or cut back to prevent black-outs. 
Other problems may arise from the unrealistic time frame set to achieve arms length 
separation. Separating two highly integrated electricity businesses is likely to be a 
complex and time-consuming task. The twelve months lead in time to full arms length 
allowed for in section 26 is an improvement upon the six months initially proposed in 
the Bill, but it is arguably still an unrealistic time constraint. It may pressure businesses 
to establish structures to comply with the arms length rules by the required date, but that 
might not be in the best interests of the business or its shareholders. 
In addition, the arms length rules in the Act are silent on the issue of sharing of 
premises between energy and lines businesses. Related businesses may continue to 
share premises, increasing the risk that the Act's objectives will be undermined. For 
example, the senior management for the two businesses could work from a common 
office, which would clearly introduce a higher risk of discriminatory behaviour by the 
lines business towards the "associated" energy business. Although physical separation 
92 EIR Act, above n 71 , Schedule I, cl 2( 11 ). 
93 EIR Act, above n 71, Schedule I, cl 2( 12). 
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is desirable, it will be difficult for many power companies, especially smaller entities, to 
achieve. 
( c) Mirror Trust Separation 
An existing trust that had a cross-involvement in an electricity business as at 23 June 
1998, .and that is either a customer trust or a community trust or both, may by 1 April 
1999 establish a new trust ( a "mirror trust") to hold the interests of the settling trust - in 
either the electricity lines business or the electricity supply business.94 
If the mirror trust option is selected, energy compames will effectively clone their 
existing trust deed and both trusts will have essentially the same beneficiaries. One 
trust will hold the lines business and the mirror image trust will hold the energy 
business. The ownership separation rules are arguably more onerous for electricity 
trusts than for other owners. Although the transitional provisions of the Act allow for 
ownership separation of electricity companies to be delayed until 1 January 2004, 
section 39 requires a mirror trust to "enter into a binding written contract to acquire all 
or part of the interests in or assets of the electricity lines business or electricity supply 
business from the settling trust or any company in which the settling trust is involved" 
by 1 April 1999. The transitional provisions do not apply to electricity trusts and 
ownership separation is not required. 
Electricity trusts are required to follow a prescribed scheme for the implementation of 
mirror trust separation. Existing electricity trusts must: 
i) Establish a mirror trust, which involves the duplication of the existing electricity 
trust (the settling trust) to form a new trust (the mirror trust);95 
94 EIR Act, above n 71, s 37. 
95 EIR Act, above n 71, s 37. 
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ii) Use a mirror trust deed that complies with the Act (and make any necessary 
adjustments to their own trust deed). The mirror trust deed must have terms "as 
near as they may reasonably be" to the terms of the existing trust deed;
96 
iii) Appoint trustees for the mirror trust that are different from the trustees for the 
settling trust and who are not otherwise "involved" in both trusts;
97 
iv) Classify the assets of the electricity business into an electricity lines business 
and electricity supply business;98 
v) Settle one of the businesses from the settling trust to the mirror trust so that the 
electricity lines business and electricity supply business are held by different 
trusts; 99 and 
vi) Ensure both trusts comply with the Arms Length Rules.
100 
If the separate trusts contravene the Arms Length Rules, 
10 1 the mirror trust exemption 
ceases absolutely and the separate trusts must immediately achieve ownership 
separation. 102 A defence is provided for technical and immaterial contraventions where 
the offending person is unaware of the contravention and then remedies it as soon as 
practical after having become aware of it. 103 
(d) Corporate Separation 
Corporate separation means that electricity lines businesses and electricity supply 
businesses must exist in separate companies.
104 However, common ownership or 
"cross-involvements" between the two companies may be retained. 
96 EIR Act, above n 71, s 41 . 
97 EIR Act, above n 71 , s 41 (1). 
98 EIR Act, above n 7 1, s 37(1), s 39(2). 
99 EIR Act, above n 71 , s 39(2). 
100 EIR Act, above n 71, s 38(2). 
101 See text at footnote 87. 
102 EIR Act, above n 71, s 45(1 ),(2). 
103 EIR Act, above n 71, s 45(3). 
104 EIR Act, above n 71, s 24. 
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Existing integrated energy companies must implement a corporate split of the lines and 
energy businesses by 1 April 1999, but the companies will have until 1 January 2004 to 
achieve a full ownership split (sale of one of the businesses). Ownership separation 
must occur at some stage before 1 January 2004. Once ownership separation has 
occurred it is not possible to return to corporate separation. 
2 The Second Deadline - 1 January 2004 
Subject to certain interim exemptions, ownership separation is achieved and enforced 
via certain rules and specific options for compliance. The main rules are: 
i) Section 17: the cross-ownership prohibition; 
ii) Section 18: the 20 per cent aggregate cross-ownership prohibition; and 
iii) Section 20: the non-specific interests rule. 
(a) General Cross-Ownership Prohibition105 
The section 1 7 cross-ownership prohibition is the most important requirement of the 
ownership separation rules. The key concept that drives the continuation of separation 
of the two businesses is that of "involvement". Where a person is "involved" in an 
unseparated electricity business, the person is involved in both an electricity lines 
business and an electricity supply business. 
The definition of "involved" in section 7 encompasses three levels: 
105 EIR Act, above n 71, s 17. Cross-ownership prohibition -
(1) No person involved in an electricity lines business may be involved in an electricity 
supply business. 
(2) No person involved in an electricity supply business may be involved in an electricity lines 
business. 
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i) Direct involvement. 
This includes owning or operating any of the core assets of the business, 106 
alone, together with an associate, or as an agent. 107 
The definition of "associate" is found in section 12. It covers the directors of 
bodies corporate; related body corporates and their directors; spouses or 
children; persons "living together in a relationship in the nature of marriage"; 
partners under the Partnership Act 1908; and persons acting in joint ventures, 
among others. 108 
ii) Exceeding the 10 per cent threshold of voting rights or equity return rights in 
the business. 109 
The 10 per cent threshold is exceeded in two situations. First, where a person 
holds more than 10 per cent control rights in the other business. Control rights 
are voting rights or rights to obtain or exercise voting rights, such as shares, 
options, convertible notes and proxies. Secondly, where a person holds more 
than 10 per cent equity return rights, namely rights to receive distributions, 
profits and rebates, and includes benefits derived directly or indirectly 
referenced to capital, residual economic value and profitability. It also includes 
rights to receive returns as trust beneficiaries. 
There is no relativity in the definition of "involved". A 10 per cent interest in 
one business that has 15 ,OOO customers may be significantly different from a 10 
per cent interest in a business with 250,000 customers. Notwithstanding this , 
each interest is subject to the same provision. 
106 EIR Act, above n 71 , s 7(3). 
107 EIR Act, above n 71 , s 7( 1 )(a) . 
108 EIR Act, above n 71 , ss 12( 1 )(a)-(g). 
109 EIR Act, above n 71 ,, s 7(1 )(b ). 
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iii) Having material influence over the business by carrying on, or by managing a 
. h b . b b . IIO person carrymg on, t e uszness or y emg a person. 
Material influence embraces persons who do not breach the 10 per cent 
threshold but still have material ability to influence business. Managers, 
trustees, councillors and directors will all have material influence. Material 
influence is defined widely to include shareholders when acting as directors and 
associates. 
(b) Statutory Exemptions to Cross-Ownership 
Section 19 of the Act provides certain exemptions to the scope of application of the 
ownership rules. Exemptions are granted to lenders, sharebrokers and their proxies; 
where the business, involvement or interest is exempted by the Commerce Commission 
under section 81; or where the interest is declared, by regulations made under the Act, 
to be a disregarded business, involvement or interest. 111 
For example, banks will be protected from direct liability under the Act arising from 
their commercial lending activities with New Zealand electricity businesses pursuant to 
section 19(l)(a). Section 19 provides that no account may be taken of the bank' s 
involvement or interest in an electricity business where the ordinary business of the 
bank consists of, or includes, the lending of money; and the bank has the involvement 
or interest only as a result of security given to the bank for a loan or guarantee entered 
into in the ordinary course of business of the relevant electricity business; or enforcing 
that security. 
The Act will not apply directly to the bank by way of the bank's commercial lending 
activities with the electricity business. The application of the Act is based on a person's 
" involvement" in an electricity business. It will be important for banks and 
sharebrokers to remain within the parameters of the section 19( 1) exceptions and to 
110 EIR Act, above n 71 , s I !(!)(a) . 
11 1 EIR Act, above n 71, s 87(1)(a) and (b) . 
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meet the relevant conditions, such as the test of acting "in the ordinary course of 
business". 112 
(c) Problems Inherent in the General Cross-Ownership Prohibition 
The ban on cross-ownership in section 17, coupled with the strict ban on "material 
influence" and "association" could, over time, cause a large number of ordinary New 
Zealanders and New Zealand companies to unwittingly break the law, because they will 
find themselves, through legacies, endowments, mergers or even "a relationship in the 
nature of marriage" in breach of the government's requirements.
113 
(d) 20 per cent Aggregate cross-ownership prohibition 
A person who is involved in an electricity supply business may' not acquire interests in 
an electricity lines business if that person, together with any other number of persons 
who are involved in the supply business, would then in aggregate: 
1) hold more than 20 per cent of the equity return rights or control rights in that 
lines business; 114 or 
2) have material influence over that lines business. 
115 
The rule applies inversely to persons involved in electricity lines businesses. Only 
those investors who are "involved" in a supply business are included in a calculation of 
whether the aggregate 20 per cent threshold in lines or supply business has been 
exceeded. Existing holdings that exceed the 20 per cent aggregate level must be 
112 See, for example Countrywide Banking Corp Ltd v Liquidator Of CB Sizzlers Ltd; Countrywide 
Banking Corp Ltd v Dean (1998) 8 NZCLC 261,509; [1998] 1 NZLR 385; Modem Terrazzo Ltd (in liq), 
Re ; Bowden & Ors v Macdonald & Anor [ 1998] I NZLR 160, ( 1997) 8 NZCLC 261,478 . 
113 EIRAct, above n 71 , s 12(l)(c). 
114 EIR Act, above n 71, s I 8(2)(a). 
115 EIR Act, above n 71, s I 8(2)(b ). 
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reduced by 1 January 2004. 116 If the parties involved cannot reach agreement they must 
follow a compulsory pro rata sell-down to the 20 per cent threshold.
117 
The Act provides no guidance as to how electricity companies or investors themselves 
are to monitor whether the 20 per cent aggregate cross-ownership prohibition has been 
breached. A listed company is able to obtain certain information about its own 
shar~holders through the substantial security holder notice provisions in Part II of the 
Securities Amendment Act 1988. 118 However, this does not extend to information 
about a shareholder's "associates", 119 nor to details of a shareholder's other 
investments. Therefore, most purchasers of shares, as well as the electricity companies 
themselves, will be placed under an impossible obligation. None of these persons will 
know whether the acquisition of a parcel of shares in a supply company or a lines 
company will bring about a breach of section 18, because they will be unaware of what 
other cross ownership situations already exist. 
(e) Non-specific interests rule 
The purpose of this rule is to ensure ownership separation is required of trust-like 
entities where there are significant levels of membership in both electricity lines and 
electricity supply businesses. The number of beneficiaries must not overlap by over 20 
per cent between two trusts holding different types of electricity businesses. 120 The Act 
also prohibits beneficiaries of a trust holding one type of electricity business from 
having more than a 20 per cent overlap with the shareholders in the other type of 
electricity business. 
Mirror trust separation 1s exempted from the non-specific interests rule. 121 An 
exemption is also possible for widely-held companies breaching the 20 per cent overlap 
116 EIR Act, above n 71, s 36( 1 ),(2). 
117 EIR Act, above n 71 , s 36(5). 
11 8 Securities Amendment Act 1988, Part II. 
119 See text at footnote 108. 
120 EIR Act, above n 71 , s 20 
121 EIR Act, above n 71 , s 43 . 
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if no one in the overlap is "involved" in the widely-held company. 122 This exemption 
allows community trusts or other trusts to set up a company and transfer one type of 
business to that company, and to vest the shares in the company in their community or 
beneficiaries, even when there will be an overlap. 123 
D ECNZ Split 
Part 8 of the Act concerns the split of ECNZ into 3 baby State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). Based on current forecasts, this should give rise to a generation market with 
the following market share in 2002: 124 
a) SOE 1 (Waikato hydro): 
b) SOE 2 (Huntly thermal, Te Awamutu 
thermal, Tongariro hydro): 
c) SOE 3 (Manapouri and Waitaki hydro) 
d) Contact (Clutha hydro, Wairakei and 
Ohaaki geothermal, oil and gas fired thermal) 
e) Private (gas fired thermal, small hydro) 
13 per cent 
17 per cent 
30 per cent 
25 per cent 
15 per cent 
Pursuant to section 98, at any time before I April 2000 ECNZ's Shareholding Ministers 
may direct that assets and liabilities of ECNZ, or of any wholly-owned subsidiary of 
ECNZ, be transferred to any one or more State enterprises. The directors of ECNZ 
must comply with that direction and are relieved from any liability that could arise by 
virtue of compliance with that direction. 125 
122 EIR Act, above n 71, s 34. 
123 
Energy Markets Policy Group Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998: Ownership Options (Ministry of 
Commerce, July 1998) 7. 
124 
Hon Winston Peters, Treasurer; Rt Hon Bill Birch, Minister of Finance; Hon Max Bradford, Minister 
of Energy "A Better Deal For Consumers. Electricity Reforms" (media release, 7 April 1998), 2. 
125 EIR Act, above n 71, s 98(l)(a). 
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The mechanics of the ECNZ split are not specified in the Act, but are being dealt with 
by an Electricity Reform Transition Unit ("ERTU"). ERTU's role is to design the 
configuration of each of the new State generators and the transactions that will be 
required to establish them as viable businesses. In September 1998 ERTU reported to 
ECNZ's Shareholding Ministers that the split of ECNZ into three new SOEs would 
proceed to the next stage. ERTU found that the split would meet the government's 
objective of a more competitive electricity generation market. The report set out a 
detailed implementation plan for effecting the split, including the transfer of assets and 
existing contracts from ECNZ to the new SOEs, the transfer of staff, a financial 
structure and arrangements for ECNZ's debt management. 126 
On completion of the restructuring, certain existing restraints on ECNZ are to be 
removed. These include the cap on ECNZ providing more than 50 per cent of new 
capacity; the requirement for ECNZ to "ring-fence" any new capacity it provides; and 
the requirement for ECNZ to offer a high level of its capacity to customers each year on 
longer term contracts. 127 
E Role of Commerce Commission and regulation-making powers 
Despite the framework for industry-specific regulation established by the Act, the 
Commerce Act continues to apply. 128 The Commission has power to exempt any 
business, involvement or interest from the application of the Act, or exempt any person 
from compliance with regulations made under the Act. 129 
The Act also gives the government extensive regulation-making powers under section 
87. Regulations may be promulgated for the following purposes: 
126 
"ECNZ Split - Another Step Closer to Lower Prices" (media release, 15 September 1998). 
127 See text at footnote 22. 
128 EIR Act, above n 71, s 82. 
129 EIR Act, above n 71, s 81 ( 1 ), s 87( 1 )(a),(b ). 
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1) to classify assets and activities in relation to the definitions of "electricity lines 
business" or "electricity supply businesses"; 
130 
2) to provide for disclosure of involvements or interests in electricity businesses; 
131 
3) to provide such anti-avoidance measures as are necessary to ensure that the 
purposes of the Act are not defeated (this "catch-all" provision permits 
regulations to be made in relation to a broad range of matters); 
132 
4) to alter the Arms Length Rules; 133 and 
5) to provide for a number of administrative matters. 
134 
Section 88 also provides for regulations to be made to restrain line charges for domestic 
and rural consumers. These regulations do not apply to charges relating to the national 
grid, however. Price restraint may involve control over the amount of the charge or any 
component of the charge; the frequency of the charge or component of the charge; or 
the increase in the charge. The Act is silent as to the form of price control that the 
government may adopt. 
During the select committee process, there was considerable concern among consumer 
groups that lines businesses would be under pressure to allocate costs where they fell , 
and that they would not be able to average costs between large and small consumers. 
Consumer groups feared that lines networks would charge the actual costs of using their 
networks, thereby lifting the price of delivered electricity to small and rural 
customers. 135 Section 88 met this concern by reintroducing an expired provision from 
130 EIR Act, above n 71, s 87(2)(a). 
131 EIR Act, above n 71, s 87(2)(£). 
132 EIR Act, above n 71, s 87(2)(g). 
133 EIR Act, above n 71, s 87(2)(h). 
134 EIR Act, above n 71, s 87(2)(i)-(l). Administrative matters include the procedures and prescribed 
forms for applications and notices required under the Act, and prescribing the fees or charges payable 
under the Act and methods of assessing these . 
135 
Doug Matheson, President Electricity Industry Supply Association of ew Zealand "Poles Apart on 
Power Reforms" The Evening Post, Wellington, 23 June 1998,5. 
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the Electricity Act 1992. Section 63(1) of the Electricity Act 1992 allowed the 
Governor-General by Order-in-Council to regulate for the imposition of price restraint. 
This price control was in respect of electricity conveyed or supplied to domestic 
premises by electricity distributors or retailers, or both. It did not limit the Commerce 
' . 1 . . . 136 Act s pnce contro prov1s1ons m any way. 
Part _7 of the Act involves amendments made to the Electricity Act 1992. Section 95 
provides for the insertion, after section 170, of a new section 170A, allowing 
regulations to be made to provide for a system or set of rules enabling consumers to 
choose and alternate between competing electricity retailers; requiring all users of the 
national grid or distribution lines to comply with a set of rules enabling such consumer 
choice; and exempting certain persons from this. 
F Penalties for Contravention 
The enforcement and penalty regime in Part 3 is modelled closely on the enforcement 
and penalty regime in the Commerce Act. 
A contravention of the Act is defined broadly and includes anyone who has contravened 
a provision, 137 plus anyone attempting, 138 aiding, abetting, 139 knowingly concerned in a 
contravention, 140 or inducing someone else to contravene a provision. 14 1 This section 
will create potential difficulties for lawyers in the provision of advice - uncertainty will 
arise because of concern that commercial advice may breach the purpose of the Act, 
even if it meets the black letter requirements. A contravention may be enforced by any 
party, including competitors and the Commerce Commission. 
A general defence is provided for inadvertent contraventions where a person did not 
know, and ought not reasonably to have known, of the contravention and the 
136 Electricity Act 1992, s 66. 
137 EIR Act, above n 71 , s 47(a) . 
138 EIR Act, above n 71 , s 4 7(b ). 
139 EIR Act, above n 7 1, s 47(c). 
140 EIR Act, above n 71, s 47(e). 
141 EIR Act, above n 71 , s 47(d). 
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contravention arose other than from that person's action. This defence expires three 
months after the person became aware of the contravention. 
142 
The monetary penalties are tied into the Commerce Act. Pursuant to section 52(2) the 
maximum amount of the pecuniary penalty is the same as may from time to time be 
specified in section 80 of the Commerce Act in respect of each act or omission. That is, 
fines . of up to $5 million for bodies corporate and $500,000 for individuals/directors. 
The court may also award three-times damages to penalise any commercial gain 
resulting from a contravention of Part 2 (Separation of Lines and Supply - Rules and 
Exemptions) or section 68 (Duty not to defeat purposes of Parts 1 to 5).
143 Alternatively 
it may grant injunctions 
144 or order divestiture of assets or voting securities.
145 
VI ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS OF THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 
REFORM ACT 1998 
A The New Regulatory Regime 
The Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998 has dramatically altered the regulatory 
regime surrounding the New Zealand electricity industry. Light-handed regulation has 
been augmented by a structural change - ownership separation of natural monopoly 
elements from competitive businesses. A structural solution was viewed by the 
government as a preferable option to regulation in order to deliver the best outcomes to 
consumers. 
The new electricity industry specific regulatory regime will comprise the following four 
key components: 
1. ownership separation of natural monopoly ( distribution and transmission) from 
competitive (retail and generation) electricity businesses; 
142 EIR Act, above n 71, s 48 . 
143 EIR Act, above n 71, s 55(1). 
144 EIR Act, above n 71, s 52. 
145 EIR Act, above n 71, s 54. 
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2. the Commerce Act which is designed to prohibit and protect against anti-competitive 
behaviour and the acquisition or strengthening of market dominance; 
3. The Electricity (Information Disclosure) Amendment Regulations 1998 which are 
intended to make transparent the operation of businesses in the electricity industry 
that have market dominance; 146 and 
4. the threat of further regulation, including pnce control under Part IV of the 
Commerce Act, if market dominance is abused. 
This section will assess the extent to which the Act is consistent with existing 
competition policy and economic (State sector) reform, including the general tenor of 
electricity industry reform. It will propose that while the structural solution adopted in 
the Act may achieve the government's stated objectives of lower prices for consumers 
and greater efficiency, this is attained by a new and drastic form of governmental 
intervention into private property rights - the requirement for compulsory divestment of 
assets without compensation. 
B Is the Act Consistent With Competition Policy? 
The Act is consistent with competition policy in that by providing a structural solution, 
it avoids the need for heavy-handed price control and also avoids the need for an 
industry-specific regulator to be established. New Zealand's small size does not lend 
itself to funding a large competition or regulatory authority. 147 
146 The tightened Electricity (Information Disclosure) Amendment Regulations 1998 were enacted to 
prevent companies departing from the specified standard values and lives and increasing their ODYs in 
order to hide monopoly profits . Companies are no longer allowed to exceed the standard asset values and 
lives specified in the Handbook for Optimised Deprival Valuation of Electricity Lines Businesses. For 
the purposes of disclosure, companies' lines business financial statements will be confined to their natural 
monopoly activities. This is intended to make it more difficult for companies to hide cross-subsidies by 
allocating inappropriate costs to their line businesses. The strengthened Regulations also require 
companies to disclose line charges on customer bills and to publish "user friendly" summaries of their 
disclosures (in addition to their full disclosure). 
147 Fen wick, above n 9, 18. 
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Latent in ownership separation will be a round of mergers and amalgamations which 
continue the trend towards rationalisation of the electricity industry introduced by the 
State sector reforms of the 1980s. However, mergers and amalgamations may create 
potential competition law problems as oligopolies of distributors and retailers establish 
themselves. 
How~ver, an industry-specific structural solution is contrary to the general scheme of 
the Commerce Act, which was intended to be generic legislation governing competition 
in all industries. It is conceivable that the introduction of specific legislation for the 
electricity sector could be seen as the start of a move away from reliance on the 
Commerce Act and light-handed regulation towards increased government involvement 
in all areas. It may trigger a burgeoning of industry-specific regulation in other areas of 
the economy, such as telecommunications or gas, and this would be anathema to the 
New Zealand Government's laissezfaire approach to the economy. 
1 Avoidance of Heavy-Handed Regulation? 
(a) Price Control 
The structural solution created by the Act is still backed by the Commerce Act, but the 
ability to impose price control has been strengthened. In addition to the threat of price 
control in Part IV of the Commerce Act, price control provisions have been enacted in 
Part 6 of the Act. This does not necessarily mean that price control will be exercised by 
the government. The legislation is not "heavy-handed", it is simply allows a more 
interventionist policy than New Zealand has previously adhered to, and it is an 
admission that unregulated monopolies will not always act in the public interest. The 
Commerce Act is fundamentally to promote efficiency, whereas the Act meets the 
concern that price increases might be inequitable to certain sectors of the community. 
According to the National Business Review: 148 
148 John Small "Electricity Reforms Lack Any Measures To Control Prices", National Business Review, 
June 19, 1998, 18. 
LAW LIBRARY 
VIGTQRIA UNIVEl'1~ffY OF WELLINGTON 
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"There is every reason to believe that the threat of official regulation is likely to be even 
less effective than the threat of competitive entry. This is especially true in New Zealand. 
The recent history of policies toward network industries is as far removed from price 
control as is conceivably possible. This means that if the threat of regulation is to have any 
credibility, it would have to address some of the specific problems that will be faced by 
regulators ." 
Despite providing for the threat of further regulation, the Act does not specify how 
often, or when, price control may be exercised. Section 88 of the Act provides that 
regulations relating to charges for line function services may be made "from time to 
time". It is likely that price control will be used where there is clear evidence of 
excessive costs or profits - in September 1998 Mr Bradford announced that officials are 
developing arrangements under which businesses whose prices are out of line will be 
under notice that price control will be imposed. 149 Therefore, the imposition of price 
control for a period will be a form of punishment for individual companies charging 
higher than average prices. 
Nor does the Act specify the method by which the government may fix prices. It is 
possible that this was a deliberate move, revealing the government ' s continuing 
reluctance to rely on Part IV of the Commerce Act to regulate prices. Indeed, Mr 
Bradford claimed that regulating power prices has not worked in the UK or the US, and 
that these countries are now moving to require companies to sell generation or energy 
trading activities to develop competition. 150 Mr Bradford placed considerable weight on 
a comment made by the United Kingdom's Director-General of Electricity Supply that 
the problems identified with the integrated nature of public electricity supply businesses 
would be most easily resolved by ownership separation of supply and distribution. 151 
149 
Max Bradford, "New Electricity Environment" New Electricity Environment Conference (Wellington, 
7 September 1998). 
15° Chris Hutching "Bradford Presses On Energy Reform" National Business Review, June 12 , 14. 
151 
Above n 66, 9152: " ... [O]nly last week the Director-General of Electricity supply in the United 
Kingdom - the industry regulator - issued a consultation paper that concluded that full separation of 
ownership of the supply and distribution in Britain would be desirable. In essence his conclusions are the 
same as ours." 
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It is arguable that Mr Bradford's comment demonstrates that the government will not 
control prices by regulation unless the ownership separation provided for in the Act 
fails to deliver lower prices. Price control is an extreme step for the government to take 
- it sends signals to the public that the government's existing regulatory (and structural) 
policy has failed. 
Sho~ld the government be required to regulate pricing, it is submitted that the most 
favourable approach to price control is that adopted by the United Kingdom: RPI-X 
(Retail Price Index minus X). Under this model, natural monopoly lines companies are 
not allowed to increase the average price (or revenue) by more than a specified X factor, 
which is individually settled with the company, below the rate of inflation, as measured 
by changes in the Retail Price Index (RPI) . This type of price control continues 
incentives for capital investment in the distribution network (that may otherwise be 
stifled by a heavy-handed regulatory environment), and incentives towards efficiency -
companies are allowed to keep the gains from greater efficiency during the period of the 
price control. Provided that there is enough competition for supply to small consumers 
to keep prices, as distinct from costs, low the power companies will have a built-in cost 
· · · 152 cuttmg mcent1ve. 
Researching, designing and implementing an effective price cap is a major task - one 
that risks being hampered by the lack of researchers in New Zealand experienced in 
regulatory design. Even after the details of the price control mechanism have been 
published, it is far from clear that the threat of its implementation will be sufficient to 
persuade network businesses it is in their interest to avoid regulation by reducing 
prices. 153 All price control poses difficulties, however. In the United Kingdom, the 
implementation of RPI-X regulation has been more complex than was anticipated.
154 
152 
Michael C Brower, Stephen D Thomas and Catherine Mitchell "The British Electric Utility 
Restructuring experience: History and Lessons For the United States" in The National Council on 
Competition and the Electric Utility Industry The Electricity Industry Restnicwring Series 
<http: //eetd.lbl.gov/Nationa!Council/pubs/restdeba.html>,21. 
153 
John Small "Electricity Reforms Lack Any Measures to Control Prices" NBR l 9 June 1998 18 . 
154 ' ' Barton, above n 24, 136. 
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(b) An Industry Specific Regulator 
Industry specific regulators to monitor and enforce price control (and other non-price 
issues) are a hallmark of heavy-handed regulation. Unlike reform in the United 
Kingdom and Australia which established industry-specific regulators upon radical 
restructuring of public utility industries, New Zealand's restructured electricity industry 
will continue to rely upon the Commerce Act rather than on the monitoring capabilities 
of an electricity regulator. 155 
The former Chairman of the Commerce Commission has opposed the concept of 
industry-specific regulator for New Zealand, arguing that a single agency with 
responsibilities across the board, such as the Commerce Commission, allows for 
consistency between different sectors of the economy. Industry specific regulators are 
necessarily focused on a narrow set of issues and are constrained by jurisdictional limits 
tied to specific technology or services. 156 
Although industry-specific regulators may provide an independent, credible and 
accessible way of resolving consumer complaints, they have many disadvantages. By 
eliminating the need for an industry-specific body, the Act has prevented the following 
drawbacks arising in New Zealand: 
i) reduced incentives on parties to resolve disputes. In countries where industry-
specific regulators exist, businesses often focus their efforts on dealing with the 
regulator rather than competing with each other. Considerable time and money 
is spent on lobbying regulators and on avoiding, changing or complying with 
regulations; 157 
155 
The Act has not created an electricity regulator, despite pressure for such a development in the select 
committee process. The Public Power Campaign's submission stated that: "New Zealand ' s refusal to 
provide for regulation is unprecedented world-wide and is becoming the subject of derision in some 
overseas publications, notably the Guardian Weekly ... An important comparison is with the privatised 
Victorian power industry - which Peter Troughton "fixed up" after giving up on New Zealand's 
wholesale electricity market experiment .... Victoria has an industry-wide regulator, created by statute, 
independent of Government and with standin[! consumer consultative committees." 
I~ -Dr Alan Bollard, above n 48. 
157 
Light Handed Regulation, above n 40, 8. 
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ii) the biases, intellects and perseverance of regulators affecting the regulatory 
process. For example, in the United States, regulatory economist Alfred Kahn's 
enthusiasm for economically sensible pricing was a powerful force for rate 
restructuring in the electricity business, and his preference for competition 
h d h d . f . 1· 1 . 158 astene t e em1se o air me regu at1on. Kahn argued that regulatory 
commissions, which were responsible for the continued provision and 
improvement of service, believe that it is more important to protect the health of 
the companies they regulate than the interests of customers. He said: 
159 
"[Regulatory commissions] come increasingly and understandably to identify the 
interest of the public with that of the existing companies on whom it must rely to 
deliver goods." 
iii) taxpayers bearing the administrative costs of operating regulatory bodies, rather 
than those affected by the industry. It is unnecessarily burdensome to impose 
extra costs on taxpayers who already fund the Commerce Commission, even 
when the cost of running an electricity ombudsman has been estimated at 
approximately $200,000 per year, substantially less than the cost of maintaining 
the role of the Banking Ombudsman; 
160 
iv) "regulatory capture"
161 by interest groups within the industry due to the 
development of close working relationships. Regulatory capture is less likely 
where there is a single competition agency for all industries and where the 
"regulator" believes that his or her performance will be judged to a large extent 
by success in promoting competition; 
158 Irwin M Stelzer "Lessons for UK Regulation from Recent US Experience" in Professor ME Beesley 
(ed) Regulating Utilities: A Time For Change (Institute of Economic Affairs in association with the 
London Business School, London, 1996), 20 I. 
159 Alfred E. Kahn, "The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions", Vol. 2: Institutional 
Issues (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991), 12. 
160 Peter Farley, Wheeler Campbell Securities Limited "Consumer Monitoring Under a Light-Handed 
Regulatory Regime" in Conference on Exploiting Opportunities and Future Developments in Electricity 
Rationalisation (Institute for International Research, Wellington, 29 March 1995), 16. 
161 Colin Robinson "Profit, Discovery, Entry: The Case of Electricity" in ME Beesley (ed) Regulating 
Utilities: A Time For Change? (Institute of Economic Affairs in association with the London Business 
School, London, 1996), 135. 
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v) compliance costs ansmg out of distortions caused by imperfect regulation. 
Regulations that are not tailored precisely can fail to achieve their intended 
purpose, thereby causing unpredicted consequences, and regulators often face 
information and administrative lags in keeping the regulations in line with 
changing market developments; 162 and 
vi) the tendency of regulatory bodies to take over business decision-making. For 
example, the Victorian Office of the Regulator-General has sole responsibility 
for issuing operator licences within Victoria's electricity supply industry. 163 
2 Mergers and Amalgamations 
At present, distribution networks comprise the mam asset base of existing power 
companies. In the wake of the Act, supply companies that have been forced by the Act 
to separate from their previously associated lines businesses, and which do not operate 
or own substantial generating capacity, will be companies with relatively few assets, 
other than buildings and meters. These smaller companies will have relatively weak 
balance sheet structures and will struggle to compete with those supply companies with 
more customers. This is unlikely to be the case with companies that have National Grid 
assets or major generating assets behind them. 164 
The Act is consistent with existing government policy in the pursuit of efficiency: lines 
and energy businesses will be forced into "horizontal" amalgamation, 165 with electricity 
retailers and suppliers merging or buying one another until the market stabilises into a 
lower number of medium-to-large competitors. The Electricity Supply Association of 
162 Light Handed Regulation , above n 40, 8. 
163 Light Handed Regulation, above n 40, 8. 
164 Graeme Speden, "Whither the Electricity Industry Reforms" The Independent, 1 April 1998, 17. At 
July 1998 New Zealand had 37 energy companies. Twenty of them had generation assets. These 
generation assets comprise 40 hydro dams (the majority of which have been long-since paid for and 
which are not subsidised; their operating costs are minimal), 3 geothermal stations, 3 landfill gas 
fienerators , and 2 large combined cycle gas-fired stations, adding up to over 1,100 MW of capacity. 
65 
William G Shepherd Market Power in the Electricity Indust,y ( 1997) National Council on 
Competition in the Electric Industry <http://eetd.lbl.gov/NationalCouncil/pubs/mktpower.pdf>, 4. 
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New Zealand estimates that 10 or fewer separate lines and energy companies will form -
in effect an oligopoly of lines or energy companies - so that the minimum viable 
consumer base will be 400,000.
166 
The government is correct in questioning the justification for the duplication in assets 
and costs in electricity lines businesses: in New Zealand the five largest power 
companies supply only half of the population. The largest company, Mercury Energy, 
has 243,000 customers. Twenty power companies have less than 25,00 customers, with 
the smallest, Buller Electricity, having just 4,000 customers.
167 These figures do not 
compare favourably with the United Kingdom and Australia. The United Kingdom's 
East Midlands distribution company has 2.8 million customers and Energy Australia has 
1.6 million consumers.
168 According to the Ministry of Commerce, there is the 
potential for efficiency gains - through mergers of power companies - of between $40 
million and $100 million per annum if all companies are as efficient as the leading 
ones.169 
However, horizontal market power is the ability of a dominant firm (or firms) to control 
production and therefore manipulate prices - specifically to restrict output, thereby 
raising prices. It arises as a firm's market share increases in relation to the boundaries 
of the relevant overall market. This is of most concern for lines businesses, which will 
also merge into larger entities. The pressure on lines businesses will not be competitive, 
because they are natural monopolies. Instead they will be under regulatory, commercial 
and public pressure to keep their costs and prices down. It is arguable, therefore, that 
horizontal market power will itself create conditions that stifle competition - a direct 
affront on the policy behind the Act, and on competition law and policy in New 
Zealand. 
166 Mark Reynolds "Merger to Create Biggest Ever Energy Retailer" New Zealand Herald, 25 June 1998, 
12. 
167 Max Bradford, "New Electricity Environment" New Electricity Environment Conference (Wellington, 
7 September 1998). 
168 Above n 167. 
169 Above n 66, 9152. 
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C Is the Act Consistent With the Thrust of Economic Refonn? 
The Act is seen by some in the electricity industry to represent a reversal of the previous 
decade of gradual government withdrawal and to start back down the road to re-
regulation. It also moves away from the corporate separation structures utilised in the 
State sector reforms (for example, in corporatisation), but this should not be viewed as 
problematic. If a system is shown to be ineffective, it should be changed. 
Compulsory divestment of lines and energy businesses will have a twofold effect on 
electricity companies. First, State-owned generating companies will progressively 
move into retail business. Secondly, privatisation of ECNZ is foreseeable. It is 
submitted that the reforms provided for in the Act are nonsensical in the absence of 
privatisation of the SOE generators. 
1 State-Owned Generators Will Move Into Retailing 
The Act appears to allow one rule for the State and another for the private sector - the 
policy considerations requiring divestment in the interests of competition and lower 
prices for consumers have not been applied equally to private power companies and to 
the State. For example, the Act provides for 100 per cent government ownership of 
lines and energy businesses left intact while forcing divorcement of power company 
owned line and energy activities; and for generators to build or buy their own lines 
businesses provided that these are in competition with existing privately-owned lines. 
In addition, the policy of distancing the Crown from commercial ventures has been 
replaced by two provisions in the Act that allow an increased number of State-owned 
generators to move into electricity retailing. The first is section 16: 
16. Act binds the Crown - (1) This Act binds the Crown except as provided in subsection 
(2). 
(2) This Act does not apply to the Crown in so far as this Act applies, or would apply, to 
the Crown's involvement in both a business that operates all or part of the national grid and 
in an electricity supply business. 
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In addition there is provision which allows for a supply company to be in generation as 
well as supply. This enables Crown owned generation companies to buy electricity 
suppliers. Such companies, because of their size and financial backing, will have a 
significant advantage over other supply companies because there is no provision in the 
legislation to prevent them cross-subsidising their supply operation by their other 
activities. 
5. Meaning of "electricity supply business" - (1) For the purposes of this Act, "electricity 
supply business" -
(a) Means a business that -
(i) Sells electricity in New Zealand: 
(ii) Sells financial hedges for risks relating to the price of electricity in New 
Zealand: 
(iii) Generates electricity in ew Zealand: 
(iv) Trades in rights to sell or generate electricity in New Zealand 
The combined effect of sections 16 and 5 allows generators to build or buy lines that 
compete with existing lines, without lines businesses having comparable rights to own 
generators. This asymmetry will provide a mechanism for driving down the costs of 
supplying SOE end-use customers, at the expense of other network users. 
While the ability for Crown owned enterprises to compete for supply will introduce 
more competition into the industry, this ability will not be on the basis of a level playing 
field and could be detrimental to the viability of many supply companies. In particular, 
the SOEs are likely to target major users of electricity and offer bilateral contracts, 
bypassing the wholesale electricity market. This may be beneficial to large users but 
not to smaller consumers. The result will be a segmentation of the market into 
generator and non-generator customers, with the latter being supplied from a short-term 
market, which the SOE generators dominate, while the former shelter behind bilateral 
long-term contracts. 
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The break-up of lines and energy businesses will destabilise the hedging market. 170 
Few divested energy traders will have the financial substance (without support from 
their lines parent) to take long-term hedge positions. It is likely that the SOE generators 
alone will be best able to hedge prices in order to secure their future prices against 
market volatility and shortage of supply. Power companies will cope with the problem 
of divesting energy operations that have ongoing hedge liabilities by selling the entire 
energy business to one or other of the SOE generators. Those SO Es that take advantage 
of divested energy businesses will operate at a significant commercial advantage to 
energy companies that choose to operate alone or as merged entities because of their 
knowledge of the hedge market and detailed knowledge of power companies' current 
retail pricing arrangements. It is arguable that this will create another dynamic to 
promote the take-over of the industry by the four SOE generators. 
2 Privatisation of ECNZ 
If the four baby ECNZs dominate the energy market as a result of the Act, future 
governments will again face the problem of being both regulator and investor, an irony 
when one considers the thrust of economic reform in New Zealand towards rolling back 
the State from interference in commercial activity. There are several reasons why the 
additional split of ECNZ only makes sense if the government is committed to 
privatisation of the remnants of ECNZ: 
a) Four baby ECNZs competing in the same business are likely to cause serious 
damage to each other in terms of their market share and profitability. This will 
strain the relationship of each Board of Directors with the Minister who is likely 
to be responsible for all four of the new SOEs. 171 
b) The State by its nature will be seen as a "soft touch", on the one hand by interest 
groups opposed to new generation ventures and on the other by industries 
170 See text at footnote 24. 
171 Barton, above n 20, 136. 
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promising jobs and growth if they can get government assistance with consents 
or with prices; 
c) While the government is dominant in the generation industry there may well be 
a perception that vigorous competition is unlikely to occur and there may be 
reluctance by investors to invest in future generation projects. The only realistic 
. option is for the government to privatise its State-owned generators; 
d) Privatisation would be consistent with the tenor of the State sector reforms. It is 
widely perceived that corporatisation, which partially replicates private sector 
competitive conditions, is merely an interim step towards full privatisation. 
172 
Further, privatisation takes another step towards removing cross-subsidisation 
and improving the accountability and commercial performance of the generators 
SOEs. Indeed, power companies and previous Ministers of Energy, along with 
other senior ministers, have consistently agreed that the State is not the 
appropriate body to maintain power supply into the next century: 
"The appropriate approach to energy issues is to provide a commercial environment 
with commercial incentives in which those who know the industry best can use their 
knowledge to respond flexibly to the various risks that inevitably arise. That is 
much more likely than a centralised bureaucratic arrangement to result in a system 
that balances the low-cost supply with a reasonable level of security supply."
173 
"Private investors are in a position to respond far more quickly to avert possible 
power shortages and there is no need to invest public money and power stations now 
that may not be needed until well into the next millennium."
174 
"I should stress that I want to see private sector investors as the main providers of 
new capacity. The Government has better things to do with taxpayers' money than 
sink it into power projects."
175 
172 Ian Duncan and Alan Bollard Corporatization and Privatization: lessons From New Zealand (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1992), 33. 
173 Above n 66. 
174 Hon Doug Kidd, media release, 16 August 1996. 
175 Hon Jenny Shipley, April 1997, in ECNZ Electricity Under the Microscope ( 1997), 7. 
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e) The Coalition Agreement 1996 specifically ruled out the sale of ECNZ, Contact 
Energy or Trans Power. It is not clear in the Act whether the Coalition 
Agreement would cover the baby ECNZs created from the break-up of their 
parent, but the inference is that only ECNZ, Contact and Trans Power, as they 
stood in 1996 would be exempt from privatisation policies. 
176 
The new entities 
would fall outside the Coalition Agreement; and 
f) Finally, the movement of the baby ECNZs into retailing through the purchase of 
local energy companies that have been forced onto the market will improve their 
capital structures and enhance their desirability to investors. 
Rather than move the State back into heavy interference in the electricity industry, with 
the attendant weaknesses and problems of State involvement, 177 the government would 
be wise to set in place total privatisation of its generators by public share float. If the 
privatised entities perform adequately in providing competition and lowering wholesale 
electricity prices, they are unlikely to face the lack of goodwill often engendered by 
recently privatised industries. 178 
D Infringement of Private Property Rights 
"There can be no more heavy-handed regulation than forcing owners of assets to divest". 179 
The ownership separation proposals represent a new and intrusive form of government 
intervention in private corporate business that does not fit the existing mould of 
economic or competition regulation. Forced divestment of assets, regardless of 
176 
Ross Burrell "Splitting Headaches" ( 1998) The Power 
<http://www.burrell .co.nz/thepower/ecnz.htm>. 
177 See text at footnote 14. 
178 
F Fukuyama "The End of History and the Last Man" in John Kay "The Future of UK Regulation" in 
ME Beesley (ed) Regulating Utilities: A Time For Change? (Institute of Economic Affairs in association 
with the London Business School, London, 1996), 157. The issue of legitimacy is never in doubt in 
nationalised industries, as it can be in the private sector. According to F Fukuyama: "The strength of 
legitimate government is that it enjoys a reserve of goodwill which protects it when things go badly". 
179 
David J Teece and Christopher J Pleatsikas "New Zealand Electricity Reforms : An Economic 
Analysis of Impacts" in Power New Zealand Submission to Commerce Committee on Electricity fndust,y 
Reform Bill (Power New Zealand, Auckland, 8 June 1998), 11. 
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resulting loss and expressly barring compensation for such loss, is unprecedented and 
can be contrasted with other statutory measures that have enacted significant structural 
and regulatory reform.
180 The Act interferes with contractual rights and creates 
uncertainty for future investment and the security of property rights in New Zealand. 
For the purposes of this section of the paper, "property" covers every type of property 
. that is affected by the Act, including shares and obligations in reliance on ownership of 
shares or assets. 
1 Value Loss to Company Shareholders and Trust Beneficiaries 
Major value in existing power companies derives from vertical integration - the fact that 
power companies control lines, (generation, in some instances) and retailing businesses. 
Ownership separation requires that retail and generation assets must be divested from 
lines businesses. As indicated in the previous paragraphs, it is foreseeable that retail 
and generation businesses will be sold by power companies because they lack a viable 
asset base. It is likely that as the 1 January 2004 deadline for ownership separation 
approaches, many divested retail and generation companies will be forced onto the 
market. Considerable "value loss" will be incurred, depending on the market price 
achievable for the business to be sold at the time the sale is effected. "Fire sales" will 
provide a windfall gain to the purchasers of the businesses at the expense of existing 
shareholders (resulting in wealth transfers to foreign investors where the purchasers are 
overseas companies). 
Power companies will face value loss regardless of their ownership structures. For 
example, trusts will be disadvantaged in opting for either mirror trust separation or full 
ownership separation. Where a mirror trust is established before 1 April 1999, the 
beneficiaries of the trust will not suffer value loss simply because control of lines and 
energy is in two separate trusts. They will, however, suffer the costs of establishing a 
duplicate trust by 1 April 1999 and face the additional threat that if this deadline is not 
18° Compare, for example, the Energy Companies Act 1992, the Health Reforms (Transitional Provisions) 
Act 1993, the Housing Restructuring Act 1992 and the Auckland Airport Act 1987. 
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met, or if their trust does not satisfy the Arms Length requirements, they must achieve 
immediate ownership separation, with its consequent losses of value. 
The general cross-ownership prohibition in section 17, which prevents owners of lines 
businesses holding in excess of 10 per cent of a retail business, will have serious 
ramifications for large electricity trusts, such as Auckland Energy Consumer Trust ("the 
Trust") - the 100 per cent owner of Mercury Energy. The Trust will be deprived of the 
ability to participate in the ownership of a valuable part of the business as it currently 
exists, and this value loss will be borne by the Trust's beneficiaries, the local 
community. 
Persons required to sell their shares in an electricity business as a result of statutorily 
imposed divestment will, although they receive monetary consideration, no longer own 
the shares or any profits derived from them. Loss to these persons will also be 
occasioned by the opportunities forgone to profit on increases in the value of those 
shares that might have resulted, had the shares been retained and a sale not forced by 
the Act. 
However, these negative results of ownership separation must be balanced against the 
fact that the government is not directly acquiring or appropriating property, and that 
many companies have options that do not involve sale. 
2 Third Party Rights Infringements 
The consequences of forced divestment of lines and energy businesses may be very 
severe for lending institutions and others who enter into obligations with power 
companies, taking company assets as security. The diminution of assets will directly 
diminish the amount of security, thereby endangering the recovery by lenders of funds 
advanced. Separated lines and energy businesses will also face the problem of which of 
them will accept liability for loans incurred as a vertically integrated entity. 
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It is equally possible that lenders will consider lending to smaller, divested companies 
to be too great a risk. It is conceivable, albeit unlikely, that in this situation the 
government may regulate to force lenders to fund poor risks and accept obligations from 
weak, separated companies. The danger of this arises from the wide regulation-making 
powers provided for in section 87(2)(1) of the Act, allowing regulations to be made: 
"Providing for such other matters as are contemplated by or are necessary for giving full 
effect to this Act and for its due administration" 
3 No Compensation 
A particularly contentious provision, and one that lends weight to the idea that the Act 
has created a unique form of heavy-handed regulation, is section 69: 
( 1) No compensation shall be payable by the Crown to any person or in any other manner 
howsoever for any loss or damage or any taxation liability arising from the enactment or 
operation of this Act. 
(2) Subsection ( 1) applies notwithstanding any other enactments or rule of law. 
Private property rights in New Zealand are not protected by the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990, unlike part of the United States Fifth Amendment which provides: 
" ... nor shall property be taken for public use, without due compensation." 
Section 69 breaches New Zealand's constitutional safeguard for property rights, which 
lies in Ch 29 of Magna Carta: 
"No freeman shall be ... disseised of his freehold or liberties, or free customs ... but ... by 
the law of the land." 181 
181 Imperial Laws Application Acts 3(1) and First Schedule. 
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Despite this constitutional tenet, Parliament does have the power to pass legislation that 
contains a no-compensation clause. In Cooper v Attorney-General182 Baragwanath J 
considered that: 
"No New Zealand authority supports the proposition that property rights are of such 
fundamental importance as to prevent Parliament from removing them by legislation which 
it considers to be in the public interest." 
Supporters of the Act believe ownership separation to be justified in the public interest 
as a means of achieving the objective of enhancing competition to increase consumer 
welfare. However, it is a clearly established legal policy that private property cannot be 
alienated, confiscated, or interfered with by the Crown, without compensation. This 
policy is evident in several New Zealand Acts dealing with compulsory Crown 
acquisition of private property, such as the Public Works Act 1981. 183 In Central 
Control Board (Liquor Traffic) v Cannon Brewery Company Limited184 it was found 
that: 
182 
[ 1996] 3 NZLR 480, 495. 
183 Public Works Act 1981 , s60: 
s 60 Basic Entitlement To Compensation-
( I) Where under this Act any land--
(a) Is acquired or taken for any [public] work; or 
(b) Suffers any injurious affection resulting from the acquisition or taking of any other land of 
the owner for any [public] work; or 
(c) Suffers any damage from the exercise (whether proper or improper and whether normal or 
excessive) of--
(i) Any power under this Act; or 
(ii) Any power which relates to a public work and is contained in any other Act--
and no other provision is made under this or any other Act for compensation for that 
acquisition, taking, injurious affection, or damage, the owner of that land shall be 
entitled to full compensation from the [Crown (acting through the Minister)] or local 
authority, as the case may be, for such acquisition, taking, injurious affection, or 
damage. 
(2) Where any compensation is payable under subsection ( 1) of this section to any person who is the 
Jessee under any lease granted by the Crown or the local authority that acquired or took any land that is 
subject to the lease, that person shall not be entitled to any damages arising from the breach of any 
express or implied--
Ca) Covenant for quiet enjoyment; or 
(b) Covenant not to derogate from the grant contained in that lease. 
184 [1919] AC 744,747. 
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"There is a presumption that the Legislature does not authorise lands to be taken without a 
legal right to compensation - a presumption to be rebutted only by clear and unambiguous 
language." 
The Act clearly intends to remove power companies ' property by forced divestment, 
and the lack of compensation for any loss or damage resultant upon this will be contrary 
to legal policy. Expressly barring compensation is a draconian, unprecedented move by 
the government that is likely to face challenge. Indeed, the Officials Committee on 
Energy Policy, which considered possible reform in 1997, concluded that compulsory 
ownership separation risked litigation claims: 
185 
"There would be a risk of successful litigation against the crown by overseas owners of 
electricity supply companies who can substantiate a value loss (legislation would be 
required to eliminate risks in relation to claims by domestic owners) ." 
VII CONCLUSION 
In establishing a framework for ownership separation of electricity lines and supply 
businesses to eliminate the perceived problems of barriers to access, cross-subsidisation 
and monopoly profits, the government has unleashed a potentially greater problem: the 
creation of a unique form of heavy-handed regulation. 
The New Zealand Government has recognised that in general, competitive market 
processes are the most effective solutions to the concerns posed by vertically integrated 
natural monopolies. Economic efficiency was achieved to a certain extent by the State 
sector reforms of the 1980s. The corporatisation of government trading enterprises into 
SOEs established a framework in which contestable and non-contestable functions were 
separated and the non-contestable areas were made subject to the light-handed 
prohibitions of the Commerce Act. 
185 
Officials Committee on Energy, Policy Report to Ministers Elect11city Reform: Options for Electricity 
Distribution and Retailing, Annex 2, Paper 4 ( I December 1997). 
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The effectiveness of the Commerce Act has been widely debated, but it is apparent that 
light-handed controls, including information disclosure, have not effected the level of 
competition required to provide lower electricity prices to consumers. Nevertheless, the 
success or failure of light-handed regulation has to be gauged against the probability 
that natural monopoly is more widespread in New Zealand than in other countries, 
because of our small market size. 186 It is also important to consider that no form of 
regulation is able to eliminate all monopoly distortions in the economy.
187 
The Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998 will, by 1 January 2004, dismantle the 
existing structure of the industry, and substitute a structural framework comprised of 
separately-owned lines and supply businesses, whose activities will be monitored by the 
Commerce Commission. ECNZ will be split into four competing State-owned 
generators, and it is probable that all four will be privatised to maintain the 
government's distance from commercial decision-making. 
The Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998 adheres to the existing policy of separation of 
contestable from non-contestable elements of business, and general reliance on the 
provisions of the Commerce Act (augmented by an increased ability for the government 
to impose price control). For this reason it is not "an example of heavy-handed State 
intervention of a kind not seen since the days of Muldoonism".
188 
However, the Act is 
heavy-handed in that it interferes markedly with private property rights. The forced 
divestment of power company assets, without any compensation for loss incurred as 
part of this divestment, is an unparalleled government action. It does not fit the existing 
mould of economic or competition regulation. It is a step that should be strongly 
opposed in any further reforms to New Zealand's industries. 
186 "Utility Regulation in New Zealand", above n 14, 125. 
187 "Utility Regulation in New Zealand", above n 14 125. 
188 ' Doug Matheson, above n I. 
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VII GLOSSARY 
Capacity The load for which a generating unit, generating station, or other 
electrical apparatus is rated either by the user or by the 
manufacturer. Sometimes, the term "capacity" is used as a 
synonym for "capability'" 
Cross-subsidies 
Distribution 
Measures of the variation between the cost of the service 
provided and the amount paid by a customer. The difference is 
funded by payments from other customers. 
The act or process of distributing electric energy from convenient 
points on the transmission or bulk power system to consumers. 
Also a functional classification relating to that portion of utility 
plant used for the purpose of delivering electric energy from 
convenient points on the transmission system to consumers or to 
expenses relating to the operation and maintenance of distribution 
plant. 
Franchise customers Electricity customers who do not have a choice of retailer . Their 
geographic location determines which retailer sells electricity to 
them. 
Generating station A plant containing pnme movers, electric generators, and 
auxiliary equipment for converting mechanical, chemical, and/or 
nuclear energy into electric energy. 
Hydro-electric An electric generating station in which the prime 
mover is a water wheel or turbine. The water wheel is driven by 
falling water. 
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Steam (conventional) An electric generating station in which the 
prime mover is a steam turbine. The steam is generated in a 
boiler by heat from burning fossil fuels. 
Generation, electric The act or process of transforming other forms of energy into 
electric energy, to the amount of electric energy so produced. 
Gigawatt (GW) 
Gigawatthour 
(GWh) 
Grid 
Hedging contract 
Lines Business 
Network 
Retail Supply 
Business 
One gigawatt equals 1 billion watts, 1 million kilowatts or 1 
thousand megawatts. 
One gigawatthour equals one billion watthours. 
The high voltage transmission network. 
Contracts between generators and wholesale buyers relating to 
the future supply and consumption of electricity. 
The natural monopoly distribution businesses that carry 
electricity in their wires from the generators to the end-use 
customers. 
A system of transmission or distribution lines so cross-connected 
and operated as to permit multiple power supply to any principal 
point on it. 
The business of purchasing electricity at bulk supply points and 
selling it 
to retail customers. The electricity may be physically transported 
over a distribution system owned by another party, and payments 
made for the use of that system. 
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Ring-fencing 
RPI-X 
Spot market 
Substation 
Transmission 
Watt 
The separation of business functions for regulatory purposes. For 
example, there must be a clear accounting separation of 
distribution and retail functions within a distribution business. 
A regulatory formula under which the pnce of the regulated 
service is allowed to rise by the level of general inflation, the 
Retail Price Index (RPI) , minus an incentive factor, X, which the 
regulated company must recover by increasing its efficiency or 
lowering its costs. 
Market in which electricity is traded, establishing a pnce for 
electricity which equates supply and demand for each half-hour 
of the day. 
An assemblage of equipment for the purposes of switching and/or 
regulating the voltage of electricity. Service equipment, lines 
transformer installations, or minor distribution and transmission 
equipment are not classified as substations. 
The act or process of transporting electric energy in bulk from a 
source of supply to other principal parts of the system or to other 
utility systems. 
Also a functional classification relating to that portion of utility 
plant used for the purpose of transmitting electric energy in bulk 
to other principal parts of the system or to other utility systems, 
or to expenses relating to the operation and maintenance of 
transmission plant. 
The electrical unit of real power or rate of doing work. The rate 
of energy transfer equivalent to one ampere flowing under an 
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electrical pressure of one volt at unity power factor. One watt is 
equal to one joule per second. 
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IX APPENDIX I 
Chronology of the Electricity Industry 1886-1980.
188 
1886 Reefton Electrical transmission of Power and Lighting Co Ltd was 
registered, and by 1888, plant had been erected and reticulation completed 
to business premises and private residences in Reefton. The initial 
installation consisted of a 20 KW Crompton Dynamo, belt driven from a 
water turbine, installed on the Inangahua River. 
The Station was destroyed by a fire in 1911, but the plant was replaced and 
continued to supply Reefton until 1946, when the company's assets were 
purchased by the Grey Electric Power Board.
189 
1896 The Electric Motive Power Act authorised reports to be obtained on the 
possibility of supplying power to the goldfields from the water resources of 
the colony. 190 This Act prevented the untrammelled private use of all 
sources of water power for electric generation purposes, with the exception 
of cases where rights had already been granted to private undertakings.
191 
1903 The Water Power Act vested in the Crown the sole right to use water for 
generating electricity. The Government reserved to itself control of all 
sources of power not already granted, with the Governor having the power 
to acquire as public works, the undertakings of those concerned using rights 
already granted. Companies were permitted to generate electricity for their 
own use but not for sale to the public. The Act specifically prevented 
private generation for general sale and limited the role of private operators 
188 Ministry of Commerce Chronology of New Zealand Electricity Ref orm (Ministry of Commerce, 
Wellington, l 998). 
189 onnan McLeod Speer The Electricity Supply Industry in New Zealand (Electricity supply Authorities 
Association of New Zealand, Wellington, 1962), 159. 
190 Speer, above n 189. 
191 Kenneth E Jackson "Government and Enterprise: Early Days of Electricity Generation and Supply in 
New Zealand" (1988) I British Review of New Zealand Studies, I 05 . 
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in the supply of publicly generated power. 
The agency initially charged with developing the considerable hydraulic 
potential was the Department of Immigration and Public Works, created by 
Sir Julius Vogel, who was responsible for the emergence of a strong role for 
the State in developing New Zealand. 
1908 The Public Works Amendment Act eased the restrictive approach of the 
Water Power Act 1903 in principle, but left the State as the dominant force 
in generation. 
1913 The first major hydro station (Horahora, 6.3 MW) was built on the Waikato 
River by Waihi Gold Mining Company. Horahora was purchased by the 
Government in 1919 and increased to 10.3 KW capacity in 1925. This was 
the first step in the Government's national power system in the North 
Island. The plant continued to operate until 194 7, when it was submerged 
in the lake formed for the Karapiro power Station. 
1915 The Government entered the generation market in the South Island with 
Coleridge Power Station (4.5 MW). 
1917 The State Supply of Electricity Act essentially vested all powers in the 
Minister to control generation, sale and supply of electrical energy by the 
State. 
1918 The Electric Power Boards Act established statutory authorities for the 
purpose of electricity generation and supply. These were particularly 
suitable for rural areas and complemented the electricity undertakings 
established by many of the city and borough councils. 
The Act separated distribution functions from generation and transmission, 
and retailing was thereafter undertaken by a number of Electricity Supply 
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Authorities - either regional power boards or electricity departments created 
by local governments. 
1925 The Electric Power Boards Act. Electric power boards covered 
approximately 60% of the area of New Zealand, and about half the 
population. The remainder of the population lived in the main municipal 
centres, where electricity was under municipal control. 
1928 Section 306 of the Public Works Act vested the power to use water in the 
Crown, subject to any right lawfully held. Section 254 gave the Crown the 
power to take land by proclamation. 
1945 The Electricity Act established a State Hydro-electric Department 
responsible for planning, design and the operation of generation and 
transmission. Thereafter the Ministry of Works conducted the civil 
construction of power schemes, and the Hydro-electric Department installed 
electrical plant. 
1947 The civil engineering section of the Hydro-electric Department handling 
design and construction was transferred back to the Ministry of Works , 
which established a separate power division in 1959. 
1945 -1949 Shortages of energy and power capacity, power shortages were very 
common. Strong popular support for hydro construction emerged. 
1950s A Dual Committee System developed: 
( 1) Committee to Review the Power Requirements ("CRPR") - was 
involved in demand forecasting, and brought the Department of statistics 
and the Treasury together with electricity industry representatives; and 
(2) New Zealand Electricity Department ("NZED") and the local retail 
1958 
1960s 
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suppliers group, ESAA (Electrical Supply Authorities Association) worked 
together to produce 15 year forecasts of demand, which were updated 
annually. 
Meremere coal-fired power station was commissioned. 
A cable under the Cook Strait was laid to allow interchange between the 
systems in the North and South Islands, supposedly minimising the need for 
thermal firming, because high winter rainfalls in the North Island would 
balance the low winter inflows in the snow-fed South Island dams. The 
flow would in theory be in the opposite direction in summer, with the 
annual thaw flowing into lakes that provided little more than enough storage 
to regulate annual inflows. 
1967 The Water and Soil Conservation Act imposed a regulatory approach to 
water resources development, including the use of water resources by the 
Crown for hydro-electric and other purposes. All users of water were then 
required to make application to registered water boards for water rights, but 
with Crown applications decided by the National Water and Soil 
Conservation Authority, after considering the recommendations of the 
regional water board involved. 
1973 The Oil Crisis signalled the need for a coordinated approach to energy 
policy. The NZED was incorporated into the Ministry of Energy, and the 
Ministry undertook a strategic planning process. 
Feb 1980 The Government released an international marketing document: "Growth 
Opportunities in New Zealand", and invited proposals for electricity-
intensive industries to take up a surplus generating capacity estimated at 
5000 GWh. Much of the surplus was from oil-fired thermal plant, or 
combustion turbine plant, and oil fuels escalated rapidly in price after the 
1979 Iranian Revolution. 
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